




verell Harriman holds a special place in 
the ranks of important American diplomats 
of the twentieth century who represented 
the U.S. in Moscow, not only thanks to his 
personal qualities, but also because the years of his 
ambassadorship coincide with what was perhaps 
the most critical period in Soviet-American 
relations: the conception of a military and political 
alliance that came into being in the monumental 
fight against a deadly enemy. Harriman, 
Roosevelt's trusted emissary, highly esteemed by 
both the Kremlin and Whitehall, became an 
eyewitness and active participant in political 
decisions that were to affect the fate of millions of 
people. Although Harriman's Moscow mission has 
been thoroughly chronicled by the ambassador 
himself,1 and has also been studied by several 
Russian and American historians,2 the release of 
new archival documents in Russia and the U.S. 
occasions a new reading of many pages from this 
historic diplomatic mission.
A Promising Beginning
On September 27, 1943, M. Hamilton, the
acting charge d'affaires for the U.S. in the USSR, 
paid a visit to People's Commissar for Foreign
1 W. A. Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to 
Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York, 1975).
2 A. Iu. Borisov, SSSR i SshA: soiuzniki v gody voiny,
1941-1945 (Moscow, 1983); V. Batiuk and V.
Evstaf'ev, Pervye zamorozki. Sovetsko-amerikanskie
otnosheniia v 1945-1950 gg. (Moscow, 1995); V.
Iungbliud, Era Ruzvel'ta: Diplomaty i diplomatiia (St. 
Petersburg, 1996); D. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt 
and Stalin. America's Ambassadors to Moscow 
(Lexington, 1998); D. Mayers, The Ambassadors and 
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Affairs, V. M. Molotov, to communicate his 
government's desire to appoint Averell Harriman 
the new ambassador to Moscow. The visitor 
inquired whether the customary biographical 
sketch would be necessary in this instance. 
“Harriman,” replied Molotov, “is well known to 
the Soviet government and he is also widely 
known among the people of the USSR.”3 * * *Indeed, 
by this time Harriman had made his mark and was 
a welcome figure in Moscow.
The history of Harriman's special relations 
with the USSR date back to the 1920s and the 
signing of the “Concession Agreement between 
the Government of the USSR and W. A. Harriman 
& Co., Regarding Manganese Deposits in 
Chaituri,” the largest transaction of its kind 
between the U.S. and Soviet Russia, totaling some 
4 million dollars. Harriman's concession, his 
arrival in the USSR in 1926 and his negotiations 
with Leon Trotsky and other Soviet leaders of the 
time are well-documented facts. Far less known is 
the exceptional political significance that the 
Soviet government attached to the transaction and 
its relations with the chief partner of this 
agreement. Thus, in the spring of 1926, when 
difficulties began with the concession as a result of 
rival mining operations of manganese ore in the 
Nikopol region, G. V. Chicherin, the People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addressed a 
special letter to all members of the Politburo and 
his colleagues in the Commissariat (NKID), in 
which he warns:
Harriman's concession has garnered a great 
deal of attention in America and a break with
3 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki RF [Archive of Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation], f. 06, p. 29, d. 332, l. 
9. Henceforth AVP RF.
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him will have exceedingly unfavorable 
consequences for our further relations with 
America. In addition, we must take into 
consideration the importance of Harriman 
himself, who ought to be met halfway,
considering the benefit that we can still
derive from him... He is the son of a famous 
father, who might yet outstrip his father. He 
is a young man with enormous energy, talent, 
exceptional prospects and ambition. He 
understood the colossal significance of future 
interrelations between the USSR and the U.S. 
and has set himself the goal, so to speak, of 
opening up the USSR for America, and 
building his historic career on the foundation 
of these interrelations. It would be the 
height of absurdity to deprive ourselves of 
this highly useful tool by antagonizing him; 
this question should be approached not with 
near-sighted bureaucratic measures, but with 
a broad view of the significance of the 
pertinent facts.4
The signing in the following year, 1927, of 
compromise alterations to the agreement in order 
to avert a “breach” was regarded in the Politburo 
as a very important factor in maintaining the 
reputation of the USSR in U.S. business circles.5 
When continuing the concession became 
impossible for Harriman, the NKID did everything 
possible to make it look like an amicable parting. 
In February 1928, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
resolved “that the GKK [State Concessions 
Commission—V.P.] take into account the 
extraordinary political importance, within the 
bounds of reason, and meet Harriman halfway in 
his claims on us so as to avert a break with him 
and to deprive him of the possibility of prosecuting 
us.”6 It is not surprising that the final conditions 
for the dissolution of the agreement proved to be 
highly favorable for Harriman—the Soviet 
government pledged to return in the course of 12 
years (beginning in 1931) 3.45 million of the 4 
million capital that had been expended, paying 7 
percent annually on the remaining debt and an 
additional loan of 1 million dollars from 
Harriman—the first major American loan to Soviet 
Russia. The Soviets scrupulously fulfilled this
4 AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 4, p. 112, d. 153, l. 35.
5 See A. I. Mikoyan's memorandum, “Ob otnosheniiakh 
s Amerikoi [On relations with America],” dated July 27, 
1927: Arkhiv Prezidenta RF [Archive of the President of 
the Russian Federation], f. 3, op. 66, d. 284, l. 50. 
Henceforth AP RF.
6 AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 4, p. 112, d. 153, l. 63.
obligation, even during the most difficult period of 
the war (until July 1943), making regular 
payments on their debt in gold equivalent. As a 
result, Harriman realized a profit, and received 5.8 
million dollars,7 which probably made a big 
impression on the financier who had acquired, as 
the European papers wrote, a personal interest “in 
the fact that in the USSR everything took its 
normal course so that the solvency of the Soviet 
government would not fall even lower.”8
But if the concession episode had left a bitter 
taste on both sides, Harriman's next appearance on 
the Soviet scene fully satisfied all parties involved. 
I am referring to the well-known mission of 
Harriman and Beaverbrook to Moscow in 
September-October 1941—the first meeting of 
representatives of the three great powers, which 
marked the beginning of large-scale aid to the 
Soviet Union on the part of the U.S. and England. 
Harriman took an active role in the mission's 
preparations and during the course of the 
negotiations. Vying with the venerable 
Beaverbrook, he secured for himself the role of 
representing the “chief supplier,” by combining 
firmness in defending the U.S. position with an 
understanding of the questions from the Soviet 
side. Moreover, his self-possession and composure 
allowed the Anglo-Saxons to withstand Stalin's 
psychological pressure—all of which made a great 
impression on the Soviet leadership and helped to 
secure the mission's success. Stalin thanked 
Roosevelt for entrusting the negotiations to “such 
an authoritative person as Mr. Harriman, whose 
participation in the work of the Moscow 
conference of the three powers was so 
productive.”9 And although these negotiations 
were difficult, and the aid promised by the Allies 
afterwards proved to be far from the total amount, 
this did not change the main political point that 
was achieved in the eyes of Moscow—henceforth 
the USSR would really not be alone in its deadly 
struggle. “Now we will win!” exclaimed the 
emotional Maxim Litvinov who had returned from 
disgrace under pressure from the Allies; Molotov 
expressed the same thought in words that for him 
were unusually impassioned: “the pulling together 
on joint efforts that has taken place before our eyes
7 Account of Soviet Notes to August 1943, Library of 
Congress, W. A. Harriman Papers (henceforth WAHP), 
Special Files, Georgia Manganese Company, Cont. 724.
8 “Obzor inostrannoi pechati informotdela GKK ot 
5.11.1928: AVP RF, f.0129, op. 4, p. 112, d. 153, l. 89.
9 Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s 
prezidentami SShA i prem'er-ministrami Velikobritaniia 
vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. 
[henceforth Perepiska], vol. 1 (Moscow, 1957), p. 11.
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to a large extent will determine our ultimate 
success in our fight against Hitler.”10
On his part, Harriman also fully realized the 
historical significance of what had taken place, 
although he invested it with a somewhat different 
and more personal meaning. As Robert 
Meiklejohn, Harriman's faithful secretary, wrote 
in his diary, the boss “came back about eleven 
o'clock from his meeting at the Kremlin looking 
like the cat that swallowed the mouse... he said 
that he has accomplished the most important thing 
he has ever done.”11 It was not only that he, 
Harriman, had facilitated an historic breakthrough 
in relations between the two great powers that 
resulted in a military alliance, but also that he saw 
these relations in a new light. In Moscow, 
Harriman had seen a country that was capable of 
fighting and standing its ground, and a leader who 
was a firm realist with whom the United States, it 
seemed, would be able to deal not only during the 
war, but afterwards as well.
Upon his return to Washington, Harriman 
enthusiastically disseminated this conviction of his 
in government circles and in closed briefings for 
the American press. One of these appearances, 
held at the National Press Club on October 30th, 
was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and must 
have pleased the Kremlin, despite its clumsy 
translation. Harriman praised the “very able 
people,” the Red Army's officers who are “capable 
beyond all belief,” the technical acumen of the 
Soviet workers and engineers, the government's 
“good personnel,” and especially the Commander 
in Chief: “I have never met a man who kept such 
an extraordinarily large store of facts and 
information in his head. He knows every gun in 
every factory. He knows what tactics the 
Germans use and why. I am certain that he is the 
chief military thinker in the USSR and that he 
directs their war. I am certain,” concluded 
Harriman, “that the USSR will fight as long as 
they have arms and there is no reason for them not 
to have them if England and the U.S. do 
everything they should. I believe that we must 
enter this war, and the sooner, the better.”12
In so far as Stalin, as Harriman quickly 
realized, was the only person in the system he had 
created who made the serious decisions, personal 
contact with him was a decisive factor. Harriman
10 Pravda, October 2, 1941.
11 Robert Meiklejohn, World War II Diary, Mission to 
Moscow 1941: WAHP, Special Files, Meiklejohn Files, 
Cont. 211.
12 Arkhiv Sluzhby Vneshnei Razvedki (Archive of 
Russian Foreign Intelligence; henceforth SVR RF).
would later recall that he left with the impression 
that the best chances for achieving mutual 
understanding in the war and afterwards would be 
through direct interaction with Stalin.13 No wonder 
Harriman was proud of the beginnings of his 
personal contact with the all-powerful dictator and 
the role that he had played in establishing ties 
between Stalin and Roosevelt, having suggested to 
them both the idea of corresponding with each 
other regularly.14
After this first trip to Moscow, Roosevelt and 
Hopkins first proposed to Harriman that he take 
the place of the unpopular U.S. Ambassador to 
Moscow, Laurence Steinhardt, but he turned them 
down, as he prized his strategic post in London, 
where he was accepted, as he put it, practically as 
a member of the cabinet.15 While retaining his role 
as liaison between Roosevelt and Churchill, 
Harriman endeavored—and not without success— 
to become at the same time the main go-between 
for Roosevelt and Stalin. With the President's 
knowledge and approval, he began his own 
personal correspondence with Stalin and Molotov 
concerning problems of supplies to the Soviets and 
arming the Polish units in the USSR; thanks to his 
direct connection with Roosevelt and Hopkins, he 
was actively involved in decisions on the most 
important issues of Soviet-American relations, in 
the process edging out the new U.S. Ambassador 
to Moscow, Admiral William H. Standley.
Harriman's next visit to Moscow, in August 
1942 with Churchill, who had taken upon himself 
the difficult mission of explaining to Stalin the 
reasons for the delay with the second front, once 
again confirmed the American diplomat's special 
role as trusted confidant of the Big Three. On 
Stalin's invitation, Harriman took an active part 
with Churchill in all the negotiations, with the 
exception of the two leaders' “night-time dinner” 
in Stalin's apartment. And even though the 
conversation would sometimes turn unpleasant, it 
furthered the strengthening of personal contact 
between the participants who parted on good 
terms.
On his frequent visits to Washington, Harriman 
helped push forward Soviet demands in the 
capital's corridors of power. Drew Pearson, the 
well-informed reporter for the Washington Post,
13 WAHP, Writings, H. Feis Files, Harriman's 
Recollections, 1952-1954, Cont. 872.
14 Roosevelt to Hopkins, October 1941: F. D. Roosevelt 
Library (henceforth FDRL), President Secretary File, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, Russia, Box 49.
15 A. Harriman to W. Jeffers, May 30, 1941, WAHP, 
Chronological File (henceforth CF), Cont. 165.
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described Harriman's behind-the-scenes activities 
as follows:
Harriman was particularly critical of a certain 
type of sub-rosa propaganda here to the effect 
that we should give Russia just enough aid to 
enable her to weaken Hitler but not enough to 
enable her to survive as a strong force after 
the war. Harriman regards this as the most 
dangerous type of war talk which must be 
stamped out. He is urging all his friends, 
especially high Government officials, not to 
let one day go by without asking the 
question: “What has been done today to 
increase aid to Russia?”16
In early 1943 the Americans, with Harriman's 
active participation, met the Soviet demands on the 
Third Protocol regarding the tonnage of deliveries 
to be supplied by the U.S. and England.17 Another 
tangible contribution by Harriman in the 
implementation of the Lend-Lease Programs for 
the USSR was his personal initiative of rebuilding 
the railroad lines through Iran, which as a result by 
spring 1943 had become the most important artery 
for Allied deliveries to the USSR.
In June during a private lunch for two, the 
President, having engaged Harriman's self-esteem, 
asked him to take on the difficult and important 
mission of putting right the relationship with 
Stalin. Hopkins provided other arguments as well: 
Harriman's work in London was becoming less 
important, because the work there was already 
done, while the Moscow post was becoming a 
priority since it was precisely relations with 
Moscow, above all, on which the defeat of Japan 
and the postwar order in the world would depend. 
In August, Harriman finally gave his consent. He 
realized the danger of becoming “a glorified 
communications officer” (as he would write 
Roosevelt) at his new post, and he knew how 
Western diplomats in Moscow “were fenced in,”18 
but pressure from the President and his sense of 
the importance of the moment gained the upper 
hand. “Real accomplishment by an ambassador in 
Moscow,” he wrote Roosevelt from London in 
July 1943, “is a gamble with the odds against
16 Washington Post, September 8, 1942.
17 Spalding to Hopkins, May 11, 1943. FDRL, H. 
Hopkins Papers, Special Assistant to the President. Box 
177.
18 Special Envoy, pp. 219, 214.
success but the stakes are great both for the war in 
Europe and in the Pacific—and after.”19
Indeed, it was a critical moment in Allied 
relations with the USSR. The Soviets did not 
conceal their indignation at yet another 
postponement of an issue that was of primary 
importance for them, namely, the opening of the 
second front in Europe. Stalin, therefore, delayed 
agreeing to a meeting of the Big Three as well as 
his obligations regarding Japan, instead recalling 
ambassadors in London and Washington who 
enjoyed popularity in the West, and he took his 
time responding to Allied proposals for military 
collaboration. All this resulted in great anxiety in 
Washington, where they not only awaited the 
USSR's decisions on the “Japanese question,” but 
also feared the Kremlin's unilateral actions in 
Germany and Eastern Europe, and needed closer 
strategic military coordination with the Soviet 
Union for their preparations for the “big invasion 
in Europe,” the decision for which was made at the 
Anglo-American conference in Quebec. All this 
rendered particular significance to the role of the 
U.S. ambassador in Moscow.
Even before his official appointment Harriman 
had thoroughly prepared himself for the impending 
mission. He began by laying out a plan of serious 
reform for the Moscow Embassy. The main 
problem in its operations (which Harriman knew 
only too well from personal experience in London) 
was the lack of coordination between the 
diplomatic staff and the supply mission, headed by 
Brigadier General Phillip R. Faymonville. This 
interdepartmental dissension, intensified by 
personal conflict between Hopkins' “pro-Soviet” 
protege Faymonville and the “anti-Soviet” military 
attaches, headed by Colonel Joseph Michela 
(whom Standley supported), not only created a 
lack of coordination in the work of the American 
representatives, but also undermined the position 
of the ambassador. Therefore, Harriman, who in 
London had zealously protected the autonomy of 
his mission from the embassy, now adopted the 
role of a strict centralist. In personal negotiations 
with General George Marshall, the Army Chief of 
Staff, and the State Department, and with the 
President's backing, Harriman carried out his plan 
to reorganize the U.S. representation in Moscow: 
instead of the structure of military attaches and 
supply mission, a single military mission, which 
reported to the ambassador, was created, headed 
by the experienced Brigadier General John R. 
Deane, Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
19 Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth 
FRUS), The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, p. 15.
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recommended by Harriman; the two main 
antagonists, Michela and Faymonville, were 
recalled home. At the same time, in addition to the 
centralization of power in his hands, Harriman 
bagged another imperceptible but important “must 
have” for himself—he was given a supplementary 
Army channel for sending coded communications, 
which allowed him to be in direct communication 
with the White House, bypassing the State 
Department. Harriman came to an agreement with 
the President's advisor on military affairs, Admiral 
William Leahy, that he would be kept apprised of 
the most important military strategic decisions.20 
Harriman also took care that the Embassy be 
staffed with real experts on Russia by securing the 
consent of the State Department and Hopkins on 
the transfer of George Kennan to Moscow.
During several meetings with Roosevelt, 
Harriman was given a detailed view of the 
President's thinking and plans with regard to 
Moscow. Roosevelt sincerely hoped that he would 
succeed in holding back Stalin from taking 
unilateral actions unacceptable to the West 
(including territorial claims in Eastern Europe) by 
recognizing the Soviet Union as a Great Power 
that enjoyed full rights, by giving him guarantees 
of security and freedom of communications, as 
well as aid for postwar reconstruction. Harriman 
did not contradict the President, even though some 
of his ideas, for example, conducting a plebiscite
in the Baltics after their liberation by Soviet
troops, seemed naive to him. He agreed with 
Roosevelt on the main thing: “They are only 
human, those Russians... Stalin can be handled,” 
he confidently declared in reply to Admiral 
Standley's gloomy warnings during their farewell 
meeting in Washington.21 Harriman would later 
recall that his main goals when he went to 
Moscow were to assist in the maximal contribution 
of the USSR in the utter defeat of Hitler's 
Germany and to facilitate the USSR's entry into 
the war with Japan. This was worth making an 
effort for.
All that remained were the final formalities: the 
sale of the tsarist government bonds (U.S. law 
prohibited diplomats from having business 
interests in the country of residence), resigning 
from the board of directors of the family railroad 
companies Union Pacific and Illinois Central.22 In
lieu of this he received a government salary of 
$17,500 a year plus a per diem allowance. On the 
7th of October, the day after his candidacy was 
presented by the President, the Senate 
unanimously confirmed Harriman's appointment 
as Ambassador to Moscow, and on October 8th in 
London he was sworn in, pledging himself to fight 
the enemies of the United States, foreign and 
domestic. The visa documents he received as 
diplomat from the Soviet Consulate in London 
indicate that “Mr. Harriman, William Averell is 
traveling alone.”23 Harriman's wife, who did not 
leave her native New York even for comfortable 
London, did not go to Moscow, where the role of 
Embassy hostess was filled, as it had been in 
London, by their daughter Kathleen.
News about Harriman's appointment had 
reached Moscow even before the appointment was 
announced, through intelligence channels and 
other sources. The intelligence service, quoting a 
high-ranking U.S. government official, reported, 
“Harriman was a very good choice for ambassador 
to the USSR. He is a sober-minded person who 
gets on with people wonderfully. Moreover, he is 
one of Stalin's few personal friends abroad.”24 In 
the United States, Harriman's appointment was 
clearly viewed with approval: advocates in the 
administration of closer ties with the USSR 
considered it a “good sign,” the newspapers 
characterized it as a “hand of friendship extended 
to the Kremlin,” while opponents of closer ties 
found it difficult to find fault with an independent, 
popular businessman.25
In the biographical resume compiled by the 
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 
connection with his appointment, the new 
ambassador is characterized in an uncommonly 
positive light as Roosevelt's faithful comrade-in-
arms and a champion of bettering American-Soviet 
relations. The concluding words of this highly 
official document also carry a ring that is unusual 
for Soviet evaluations of “bourgeois figures” 
written during this period:
It seems that Harriman's words are not at 
odds with his actions. He was and remains an 
advocate of strengthening Soviet-American 
relations, an advocate of President 
Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies. 
He is an advocate for the utter destruction of
20 Library of Congress, W. Leahy Papers, Diaries, 
September 27, 1943, Reel 3.
21 Special Envoy, pp. 227-28.
22 Russian Holdings (Memo for W. Harriman); A. 
Harriman to the Board of Directors of Union Pacific, 
October 1, 1943, WAHP, CF, Cont. 170.
23 Ibid.
24 AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 28, p. 156, d. 12, l. 38.
25 O. Cox to A. Harriman, October 1, 1943, FDRL, O. 
Cox Papers, Lend-Lease Files, Box 86; Christian 
Science Monitor, September 28, 1943.
5
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
Hitler's war machine and an opponent of any 
compromise whatsoever with Hitler's 
Germany.26
In Moscow, even before he had presented his 
credentials to Mikhail Kalinin, nominal head of 
state,27 Harriman immediately found himself in the 
center of Allied diplomacy, namely, the Moscow 
Conference of the foreign ministers of the three 
great powers, which for the first time was to 
discuss a wide range of political and military 
issues. It fell to Harriman's lot, as is usual for 
ambassadors in such situations, to play the role of 
the delegation's chief advisor and hospitable host 
of Spaso House, the residence of the U.S. 
Ambassador. In addition, he had a secret 
commission from Roosevelt—to keep an eye on 
Secretary of State Hull so that he wouldn't “mess” 
things up before Roosevelt's meeting with Stalin.28 
The Ambassador, therefore, took part in all of 
Hull's meetings with Stalin and Molotov. 
However, the President's caution proved to be 
unwarranted: the Kremlin liked the stately, gray-
haired Hull, partly because he did not raise 
unpleasant subjects, such as the Soviet Union's 
free hand in Eastern Europe. The old Wilsonian 
won Soviet acceptance for his chief concern—the 
Declaration on General Security, which included 
China among the four signers. Attempts by 
Harriman behind the scenes to nudge Hull and 
Eden to discuss with the Russians the issue of 
Eastern Europe (above all, Poland) came to 
naught. Then Harriman himself in a meeting with 
Molotov on October 24th made an attempt to 
clarify (and at the same time forestall) the Soviet 
position on this issue, emphasizing that although 
the U.S. understood the USSR's wish to have 
friendly regimes on its western borders, the 
Americans held the position that these countries 
should retain the right to self-determination, good 
relations with the West and in no sense be 
subordinated to the Soviet Union. The People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs assured Harriman 
that the conditions he had just described were not 
at variance with Soviet policies, although
26 AVP RF, f. 0129, op. 27, p. 152, d. 41, l. 6.
27 For a subtle psychological interpretation of 
Harriman's initial mood in Moscow, see Frank 
Costigliola, “'I had come as a Friend': Emotion, 
Culture, and Ambiguity in the Formation of the Cold 
War, 1943-45,” Cold War History, vol. 1, no. 1 (August 
2000), pp. 103-14.
28 WAHP, Writings, H. Feis Papers, Cont. 45 (Moscow
Conference).
Harriman remained highly skeptical of these 
assurances.29
Harriman's other priorities during the Moscow 
Conference were to reassure the Soviets about the 
second front and also to receive more reliable 
evidence of the USSR's entry into the war with 
Japan. On these two points the Americans met 
with success. The strategy proposed by Harriman 
in conference at the American Embassy, namely, 
to provide the Soviets with maximum access to 
information on Allied military actions and plans in 
order to convince them of the seriousness of their 
intentions, while at the same time avoiding any 
new concrete obligations, helped to consolidate 
mutual trust. Hints made by Soviet leaders (Stalin 
in a meeting with Hull, Molotov in a meeting with 
Harriman) transparently conveyed their intentions 
in regard to Japan.30 Other important 
understandings were also reached at this 
conference: the creation of a European advisory 
commission; the terms of Germany's 
unconditional surrender and how it should be dealt 
with afterwards; the creation of an advisory 
council in Italy, etc. On the whole, the results of 
the conference were without a doubt positive for 
all three parties and created favorable conditions 
for the meeting of the Big Three in Teheran. 
However, in his final report to the President, dated 
November 5th, Harriman was far from euphoric. 
Judging by everything, he writes, the “Soviets 
have evidently decided that they would take a shot 
at working together with the British and ourselves 
in dealing with the war and post-war problems,” 
and during the course of the conference itself, 
“being admitted for the first time into the councils 
as a full member with the British and ourselves,” 
convinced them even more of this possibility. At 
the same time, Harriman emphasized, serious 
differences emerged between Soviet policies and 
those of the Allies. The chief of these was the 
issue of the second front, because “it is impossible 
to overemphasize the importance they place 
strategically on the initiation of the so-called 
second front next spring.” To ease these Soviet 
concerns Harriman proposed that in addition to a 
personal meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin, 
representatives from the USSR should be invited 
to the Anglo-American military consultations, 
although he admitted that this process “will be to 
some extent a nuisance and time-consuming.” But 
the greatest threat to Allied relations, as he
29 Memorandum of Conversation with Molotov, 
October 24, 1943, WAHP, CF, Cont. 170.
30 Personal Notes regarding dinner with Molotov and 
Stalin, October 30, 1943. Ibid.
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perceptibly observed, lay in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union, wrote Harriman, will firmly insist 
on a return to the borders of 1941: “They have the 
impression that this has been tacitly accepted by 
the British and the fact that we didn't bring up the 
issue may have given them the impression that we 
would not raise serious objections in the future.” 
As far as the USSR's western neighbors were 
concerned, above all Poland, the essence of the 
Soviet position on this issue, according to 
Harriman, was that “although they would keep us 
informed, they'd take unilateral action in respect to 
these countries in the establishment of relations 
satisfactory to themselves.” However, the 
Ambassador added, “that rigid attitude may well 
be tempered in proportion to their increased 
confidence in their relations with the British and 
ourselves in the establishment of overall world 
security.”31
Consequently, the Allies had a fair chance of 
resolving the most complicated issues, providing 
that mutual trust was strengthened and it was this 
that Harriman viewed as the most significant 
achievement of the Moscow conference, equal in 
importance to the concrete agreements. Summing 
up the accomplishments at a meeting of the 
Embassy's diplomatic staff, he paid particular 
attention to the “willingness and ability of the 
representatives of the three countries to work 
together,” which brought relations with the 
Russians “close to the type of intimacy that exists 
in the discussions between the British and 
ourselves.” Developing this notion set forth by the 
Ambassador, the State Department advisor on East 
European affairs, Charles Bohlen, who was present 
at the meeting added that the conditions had now 
been created for the discussion of any and all 
problems, including those on which the Allies did 
not all agree, without detriment to their 
fundamental unity of purpose; this new situation 
“marked the return of the USSR as a fellow 
member of the society of nations with the sense of 
responsibility that this carried with it.”32 This new 
turn in Allied relations was also sensed on the 
Soviet side, flattered by its acceptance into the 
club of the Great Powers. “The Conference 
revealed the presence of common points of view 
on a number of important questions on the war and 
the postwar order,” stated a memorandum of the 
NKID on the results of the Moscow Conference. 
“The Soviet delegation's observations and
31 A. Harriman for the President, November 5, 1943, 
WAHP, CF, Cont. 170.
32 Staff Meeting at American Embassy, November 9, 
1943. Ibid.
proposals were taken into account very 
seriously.”33
The main task after the conference, as 
Harriman summed it up at the Embassy meeting, 
was to maintain and develop the conference's 
spirit of trust. To accomplish this they needed “to 
show the Russians (1) we are for the war first, (2) 
we accept them as equals; (3) we have an intense 
interest in their reconstruction.”34
This last point for a time became Harriman's 
favorite hobby-horse, since he viewed postwar 
economic assistance not only as a means for 
strengthening the Russians' trust, but also as a 
lynch-pin for influencing their policies.
In anticipation of the Teheran Conference 
Harriman flew to Cairo to meet the U.S delegation 
and assist in the preparations for the conference. 
At the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he once 
again emphasized the importance for the Russians 
of the issue of the second front (“it had been 
difficult for the Russians to understand why two 
nations of the strength of the U.S. and Britain have 
been unable to contain more German forces than 
they have”35), while in talks with Hopkins during 
their flight to Teheran it was agreed that Roosevelt 
should be roused to raise the issue of aid to the 
Soviet Union for postwar reconstruction.36 The 
President, however, did not do this; in a note to 
Harriman he pleaded lack of time (“I didn't have 
time to talk with the Russians”); he commissioned 
Harriman to clear up Moscow's questions and to 
make his own recommendations on that score.37
The question of opening the second front was 
finally resolved in Teheran once and for all, which 
the Soviet diplomats considered to be the chief 
achievement “of the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill 
conference.”38 At a meeting at the Embassy upon 
his return to Moscow, Harriman stated that the 
most important psychological effect of Teheran 
was that “the conference laid at rest the feeling that 
existed among the Russians that we were not doing 
enough and doubts that existed as to our real 
intentions.” No less important, in his view, was the 
establishment of direct personal contact between 
Stalin and Roosevelt: “Stalin felt very much at 
home with the President. Our ideas are much
33 AP RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 233, l. 67.
34 Staff Meeting at American Embassy, November 9, 
1943, WAHP, CF, Cont. 170.
35 JCS Meeting, Cairo, November 24, 1943, WAHP, 
CF, Cont. 170.
36 Memorandum of Flight, Cairo to Teheran, November 
27, 1943, Ibid.
37 F. Roosevelt to A. Harriman, December 1, 1943, 
WAHP, CF, Cont. 171.
38 AP RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 222, l. 136.
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closer to the Russians than those of the British. 
Stalin treated the President as the senior member 
of the party and was very anxious to find what was 
on his mind and he liked what he found and treated 
the President with extraordinary deference and 
respect.” The ambassador concluded that the 
wording of the Teheran Communique, “'Friends in 
fact, spirit and in purpose' sounds like generalities 
but there is a meaning in every sentence and it 
describes very much what the discussion was and 
the resulting effect on the men.”39
Encouraged by the results of Teheran and his 
reception in Moscow, Harriman advanced an 
ambitious agenda for several aspects of American- 
Soviet cooperation. At his suggestion the 
Ambassador's old friend, Director of U.S. Office 
of Strategic Services, William Donovan, visited 
Moscow in late December 1943 with the aim of 
arranging cooperation between the two countries' 
intelligence services. Donovan was received by 
Molotov, after which followed a cordial meeting 
with his Soviet counterpart, the head of the PGU 
(First Chief Directorate) NKGB, General P. Fitin, 
at which they came to an agreement about an 
exchange of representatives of the OSS and PGU 
between Moscow and Washington. “Our 
comrades,” remarked Molotov at a meeting with 
Harriman on December 31st, “are also pleased with 
the meetings with General Donovan, moreover, 
Donovan's proposal to exchange representatives 
will evidently be deemed to be expedient.”40
The Kremlin's unusual responsiveness to 
Donovan's proposal was understandable—given 
the differences between a regime of secrecy and 
the freedom to gather information in the two 
capitals, which made the exchange much more 
advantageous for Moscow than Washington. 
Nevertheless, the plan received Roosevelt's 
support and preparations for opening the missions 
were begun on both sides. In a move that was 
absolutely unheard of for that time, Fitin gave the 
Americans his telephone number, which won over 
even General Deane: “It was my first telephone 
number in Russia and I felt I had achieved a 
tremendous victory.”41 The personnel of both 
missions was being selected, and the Americans 
had even managed to begin acquiring the 
necessary equipment, including caps with ear-
39 Staff Meeting, December 8, 1943, WAHP, CF, Cont. 
171.
40 Meeting with U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman 
and the head of the U.S. Bureau of Strategic Services, 
General Donovan, December 25, 1943. AVP RF, f. 06, 
op. 5, p. 29, d. 232, l. 92.
41 J. Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 53.
flaps.42 However, in Washington they quickly ran 
into an obstacle: the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar 
Hoover, with the support of Admiral Leahy and A. 
A. Berle, Jr. (who was responsible for security 
issues in the State Department) talked the 
President out of this risky undertaking. On March 
15th Roosevelt charged Harriman with the task of 
explaining this decision to Stalin “for purely 
domestic, political reasons,” alluding thereby to 
the forthcoming presidential election. Harriman, 
who had viewed the exchange as a breakthrough in 
cooperation at the most sensitive levels, was 
exceedingly disappointed. “We have penetrated 
here for the first time one intelligence branch of 
the Soviet government and I am certain this would 
be the opening wedge to far greater intimacy in 
other branches if pursued.”43 Roosevelt, however, 
was unyielding and this decision, which later 
Harriman would call “supreme folly,” remained in 
effect.
A similar fate ultimately befell another of 
Harriman's large-scale projects, namely, granting 
the Soviet Union credit for the purchase of 
American goods and equipment after the war. He 
had first raised the subject on his own initiative as 
early as October 1943 in talks with the People's 
Commissar for Foreign Trade, A. I. Mikoyan, 
who, in his words, had shown “great interest.” As 
a businessman and diplomat, Harriman well 
understood the significance of this issue for 
resolving the main primary and economic issue for 
the Soviet Union after the war—reconstruction (as 
he wrote to the State Department in November 
1943). He viewed the purpose of granting this 
credit as assistance to American trade and 
employment during the difficult period of 
reconversion of the U.S. economy (“getting our 
proper share of Soviet post-war business”), a 
general strengthening of ties with the USSR, and 
finally, using the “carrot” of assistance to nudge 
the Soviet leadership to “work cooperatively with 
us on international problems in accordance with 
our standards.”44 This last point will become more 
acute with the increasing disagreements over 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.
While continuing, with the White House's 
knowledge, preliminary talks about the credit with
42 See G. Marshall to Deane, February 16, 1944—NA 
RG 334, OSS (General), Box 18. Colonel George 
Haskell was appointed head of the US Moscow mission, 
and A. Grauer, chief of the Anglo-American department 
of the PGU (First Main Directorate) was to head the 
NKVD representation in Washington.
43 Special Envoy, p. 294.
44 A. Harriman to the Secretary of State, January 9, 
February 14, 1944, FRUS, 1944, vol. 4, p. 1034.
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Molotov and Mikoyan, Harriman dispatched to 
Washington his thoughts on the conditions for 
granting the credit, at the same time asking for 
concrete instructions on this matter. On January 
9th, he received a general go-ahead to his plan from 
the President and Hopkins. This dispatch for some 
reason was not included in the official publication 
of State Department documents, but within a 
month it was on Stalin's desk, along with 
Harriman's telegrams of January 7th and 9th that 
preceded it (it was published in Foreign 
Relations).45 Soviet intelligence was obviously 
giving the credit issue special attention and 
somehow managed to intercept this encoded 
correspondence in Washington. The Soviet 
leadership, evidently encouraged by the American 
initiative, on February 1st (in the form of a 
memorandum from Mikoyan to Harriman) made 
an initial proposal for a credit of 1 billion dollars 
for a term of 25 years at a rate of 0.5 percent 
interest. Although Harriman found these terms too 
generous, he duly conveyed them to Washington, 
whereupon he received in reply Hull's instruction 
to “limit yourself to generalities.”46 It was not until 
a week later that the Ambassador received more 
detailed instructions, but they too provided little 
assistance in the matter: general support for the 
plan of a credit was to be linked to a final 
accounting of Lend-Lease and a reminder about 
the strict legal limitations on granting government 
credits to the Soviet Union, as mandated by the 
Johnson Act. At the same time, it was proposed 
that an interdepartmental group under the aegis of
the State Department be created to study the
47issue.
Knowing only too well the meaning of such 
delays, Harriman in reply insisted on a speedy 
resolution of the issue and the presentation of a 
concrete plan to the Soviets. He wrote Hopkins 
that “vague promises excite Soviet suspicions 
whereas a precise program offered now to them 
but kept always within our control to suspend will 
be of extreme value.”48 On February 18th, 
Mikoyan, at Harriman's request, submitted the 
draft of a plan for supplies amounting to the 
proposed 1 billion dollars. In Washington, 
however, the matter came to a standstill and real 
negotiations on the issue of credits would not 
begin until the fall of 1944.
45 V. Merkulov—v GKO (to Stalin, Molotov and 
Beria), February 11, 1944. Arkhiv SVR RF.
46 Secretary of State to A. Harriman, February 2, 1944, 
FRUS, 1944, vol. 4, p. 1043.
47 Ibid., pp. 1046-48.
48 Ibid., p. 1053.
Another field to which Harriman applied his 
energies was the development of military 
cooperation proposed by the U.S. in Teheran, 
above all, the stationing in the USSR of U.S. Air 
Force bases for shuttle-flight bombings in Eastern 
Europe and the ensuing war with Japan. The 
Soviets were in no hurry to allow Allied troops on 
their territory; Harriman naively explained the 
delay by the fact that the “spirit of Tehran has not 
percolated to lower echelons” of the Soviet 
bureaucracy.49 This did not prevent the Americans 
from continuing to pressure the “upper echelon.” 
Finally, on February 2nd, at a meeting with Stalin 
at which he again raised the issue of shuttle-
bombing, Harriman heard practical and detailed 
questions: how many planes would take part in the 
bombings? Who will service them—the 
Americans or Russians? What would be done 
about fuel, since the octane rating of Soviet petrol 
was not suitable for American engines? In what 
language would the air dispatchers communicate 
with the American pilots?50 Harriman's detailed 
responses satisfied the leader. (Before giving the 
Americans the go-ahead, Stalin apparently had 
decided to verify personally their concept of the 
plan by questioning Harriman, because the draft of 
an affirmative response, prepared by the General 
Staff, was already on his desk).51 After receiving 
orders from the very top, the “lower echelon” 
moved so quickly that in four month's time 
everything—three airfields, technical equipment, 
personnel—was ready to begin the operation, 
which was given the code name Frantic. “We have 
to realize,” Harriman wrote General Ira Eaker, 
Commander of the Allied Mediterranean Air Force 
units, “that the establishment within the country of 
armed forces of a foreign country under their own 
command has never before been permitted to my 
knowledge in the history of Russia.”52 *
But there had been no progress with the bases 
in the Far East. At that same February meeting 
with Harriman, Stalin had explained the delay as 
an unwillingness to provoke the Japanese before 
the time had come. “We cannot take part now in 
any operations undertaken by the Americans 
against Japan, because we do not have sufficient 
forces in the Far East,” explained Stalin (this part
49 Ibid., p. 803.
50 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945: Dokumenty i 
materialy, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1984), pp. 15-18.
51 Antonov to Molotov, January 1, 1944, AVP RF, f. 
06, op. 6, p. 46, d. 617, ll. 5-8.




of the meeting's memocon has never before been 
disclosed). “.Come summer it will be clearer. 
When we have increased our troops in the Far East 
and re-armed out aviation, we will not be afraid of 
any Japanese provocations, and perhaps will 
initiate a provocation ourselves. But if we incite 
the Japanese to take active measures before we are 
ready for this, it may end in failure and the loss of 
the coast, which would be worse for us and our 
allies.” This sounded sufficiently convincing, but 
to sweeten the bitter pill a bit more for the 
Americans the Supreme Commander adopted a 
highly confidential manner as he shared with 
Harriman for the first time some very sensitive 
intelligence: “.According to our information, the 
Japanese might quit their external line of defense 
that runs through Indonesia. They are building a 
new line of defense closer to the islands. We have 
information that the Japanese are transporting 
works and equipment from the more distant 
regions to the islands and Manchuria.”53 The 
Ambassador immediately conveyed this 
information to the President as a communication 
of great importance, adding for his own part that 
Stalin was very friendly. This was not a bad start 
and a few days later Harriman noted with 
satisfaction to Stettinius: “We are all gaining 
experience. Although we have constant 
difficulties with the Soviet bureaucracy I feel we 
are making slow but important progress.”54
Harriman's trip to the north to take part in the 
ceremony of presenting the American cruiser The 
Milwaukee to Soviet seaman passed in the same 
spirit of Allied solidarity. This act was undertaken 
by Washington as partial compensation to the 
Soviet Union for a share of the best ships in the 
captured Italian fleet, as promised in Teheran, but 
which the British and Americans were in no hurry 
to hand over to their ally.
Harriman flew to Murmansk on April 6th, 
accompanied by U.S. Navy Admiral Olsen and his 
staff, who were anxious to make use of the rare 
opportunity to see the Soviet Navy at close range. 
In addition to the customary receptions and other 
protocol functions, meetings for the Americans 
were organized with the legendary head of the 
Northern Shipping Waterways, I. D. Papanin, 
Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral A. G.
53 From the transcript of the meeting of Comrade Stalin 
with Ambassador Harriman, February 2, 1944, AP RF, 
f. 45, op. 1, d. 337, l. 37-38, 33.
54 A. Harriman to Stettinius, February 8, 1944, U.S. 
Military Intelligence Reports, vol. 2 (Soviet Union 
1941-1944), edited by P. Kesaris (Bethesda, 1985), reel 
20.
Golovko, and even (at Olsen's request, seconded 
by the Ambassador) a visit to the headquarters of 
the Northern Fleet on the Polyarnoe. In his 
remarks to the sailors, Harriman compared the 
transferral of the ship to loaning a horse that was 
sorely needed by a faithful friend who found 
himself in even greater need. “The Ambassador's 
remarks,” the Soviet escorts recorded approvingly, 
“were not long, were simply worded and did not 
smack of the excessive flattery and sugared tone 
that is often typical here for the English in similar 
circumstances.”55 Little attending to the inevitable 
dinner speeches, toasts, and songs to accordion 
accompaniment, Harriman did not conceal that he 
was interested above all in practical matters: the 
condition of the Soviet Navy, the operations in the 
ports for receiving Lend-Lease cargo, the Soviet 
utilization of American military equipment. 
“During the course of his stay on the Polyarnoe,” 
reported A. Timoshenko, the diplomatic agent of 
the NKID attached to the American delegation in 
Murmansk, “Harriman was not disposed to engage 
in aimless conversation of the ‘salon' variety. He 
noticeably tried to separate himself from those 
who had accompanied him so that he could find 
answers to questions that interested him and he 
tried to familiarize himself with the North as 
thoroughly as possible.”56 Of particular interest to 
the Ambassador were the modifications that had 
been made to American aircraft by Soviet 
technicians, so that they would answer their 
needs—the bomber Boston used as a torpedo 
bomber and the Aircobra for dropping small 
bombs. Over lunch with the sailors the 
Ambassador confessed that these uses had never 
occurred to them when these weapons were 
designed, and he noted these improvements in his 
diary so that he could pass them on to his own 
military.57 Embassy naval intelligence had also 
appreciated the Russian technical acumen: “Under 
the guise of a ‘keepsake' photograph of Harriman 
and the Soviet and American representatives who 
had accompanied him,” recorded Timoshenko, the 
vigilant diplomatic agent, “Tolly, the U.S. assistant 
naval attache, photographed the aircraft with the 
most interesting modifications, which noticeably 
pleased Rear-Admiral Olsen, the naval attache.”58 * *
55 Harriman's stay in Murmansk, April 30, 1944, AVP 
RF, f. 0129, op. 162, d. 72, l. 25.
56 Ibid., l. 21.
57 Items of Interest to Army regarding trip to Northern 
Russian ports, WAHP, CF, Cont. 172.
58 Harriman's stay in Murmansk, l. 27. In 1994 the
author met with retired Admiral Tolly who remembered
this episode vividly, but he denied the professional 
intent. However, the modifications of the aircraft indeed
10
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
In his report to the President on the trip, 
Harriman noted with particular satisfaction the 
“competence and energy” of the port operations in 
Murmansk and Archangel, which received up to 
12,000 tons of cargo in a twenty-four-hour period, 
as well as the high professionalism of the Soviet 
sailors who quickly mastered the new ship, now 
called the Murmansk: “The cordiality with which I 
was received was almost embarrassing. A deep- 
seated gratitude for our assistance was shown by 
all, military and civilians alike.”59
In turn, the Soviet representatives were greatly 
impressed by their distinguished American guest. 
In the opinion of Papanin and others, as reported to 
Harriman by the U.S. assistant naval attache in 
Archangel, “You are the ideal type of man our 
Ambassador should be.” And this was not 
flattering exaggeration in so far as even 
Timoshenko concluded his report on Harriman's 
trip in a key that was unusually complimentary for 
this genre: “The Ambassador's competence in 
various questions of technical matters and 
equipment, as well as his simple and natural 
manner in conversation won over the Soviet 
military personnel and government representatives 
and many of them spoke of him as a ‘remarkable 
man' and called him a ‘very bright head.'”60
The First Frost
However, even this period of great 
expectations was not free of grievances on both 
sides. Towards the beginning of the year, the 
Embassy and the U.S. military mission, which was 
tracking, as closely as conditions allowed, actual 
utilization of supplies the Soviets received under 
Lend-Lease, came to the conclusion that the USSR 
was asking for more than it could realistically use 
in the war effort, particularly in the sector of 
industrial equipment. Harriman turned to Hopkins 
with a request to grant the Embassy authority over 
verifying Soviet orders and to demand from the 
USSR a more detailed accounting of how the 
American supplies were being used. In 
Washington there were differences of opinion: 
Harriman and Deane were supported by the 
Foreign Economic Administration, which was 
responsible for the Lend-Lease program as a 
whole, but the President's Committee on Soviet
Protocol under Hopkins came out against a change 
in the current practice. Roosevelt got involved in 
the matter. At Hopkins' suggestion, the President 
sent the Secretary of State an unambiguous 
memorandum: “Russia continues to be a major 
factor in achieving the defeat of Germany. We 
must therefore continue to support the USSR by 
providing the maximum amount of supplies which 
can be delivered to her ports. This is a matter of 
paramount importance.”61
This struggle behind the scenes did not escape 
the notice of Soviet intelligence, which by all 
appearances had quite good informants in the 
corridors of Washington. “The Foreign Economic 
Administration, having carried over Harriman's 
statement that the USSR receives from Lend-Lease 
too many materials that are not used for war needs, 
presented to Hopkins a report defending that 
opinion,” Fitin reported to the leadership of the 
NKID. “Roosevelt suggested that an end be put to 
this nonsense and issued directives to all the 
ministries that the USSR is playing a major role in 
the war.”62 Harriman was forced to submit, 
although at a meeting in the Embassy he did not 
hide his irritation at the Committee on Soviet 
Protocol: “their way to get along with the Russians 
is to do everything they ask. This is not the way to 
get along. They are tough and expect us to be 
tough.”63
Harriman was also troubled by the increasingly 
independent nature of Moscow's unilateral actions. 
For example, Moscow did not wish to consult with 
the Allies on such questions as recognizing the 
Badolgo government in Italy—in the zone of U.S. 
and British interests. The Ambassador appealed to 
the Secretary of State: “We should not let the 
Soviets get away with this sharp practice. while 
the Soviets learn how to behave in the civilized 
world community,” so that they don't start 
“playing the part of a world bully.”64
A much more serious irritant for both sides 
became the question of Poland's future. Harriman 
treated with understanding the Soviet leadership's 
unwillingness to have dealings with the “London 
Poles”—from his own experience working in 
London he knew only too well their 
uncompromising anti-Soviet stance, compounded 
by Russophobia, and he hoped for a reorganization 
of the Mikolajczyk government that would be
were perfectly captured on the photographs that he 
showed me.
59 A. Harriman to the President, April 14, 1944, WAHP, 
CF, Cont. 172.
60 A. Harriman to the President, April 14, 1944, WAHP, 
CF, Cont. 172.
61 President to the Secretary of State, February 14, 
1944, FRUS, 1944, vol. 4, p. 1053.
62 Fitin to Comrade Dekanoozov, March 14, 1944, 
Arkhiv SVR RF.
63 Special Envoy, p. 310.
64 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1056.
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acceptable to the Kremlin. He was persuaded of 
this even more by President Benes of 
Czechoslovakia, who had come to Moscow in late 
1943 for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with 
the USSR. The Kremlin, according to Benes who 
had discussed the issue with Stalin, did not intend 
to communize Poland and above all was interested 
in the recognition of the new eastern boundary of 
Poland along the Curzon Line, as well as a general 
pro-Soviet orientation in the foreign policy of the 
new Poland. Harriman came to believe that the 
“Czech model” might be the solution to the Polish 
problem, which would be acceptable to all 
parties—the USSR, its western neighbors and 
Poland itself. The Russians, he said at an Embassy 
meeting that took place on February 15, 1944, 
“don't want to communize that country, but they 
also don't want Poland to go back into the power 
of the group which is definitely anti-Soviet. He 
personally thought the Russians have a very good 
case against the Polish government there..”65 At 
a meeting with Stalin on March 3rd, Harriman 
again raised this issue at the President's request, in 
an attempt to discover the possibility of a 
compromise in the Soviet position. “Again, the 
Poles?” muttered Stalin. “Is this really the most 
important issue?” (That is how the Soviet 
transcript, not previously cited by historians, 
records this conversation.) Further on, Stalin 
sharply speaks out against the “London Poles”— 
those “landowners and Polish Tories, whom the 
people won't even let back into Poland. They all 
think Russians are farm laborers [batraki, i.e., 
involuntary servants—V.P.],” he added with a note 
of exasperation. “The Russians must liberate 
Poland, but the Poles want to be given Lvov. 
Everybody thinks that Russians are fools.” 
“Harriman says,” the transcript of this 
conversation made by V. Berezhkov, continues, 
“that he is not the right person to defend the 
London Poles. He, Harriman, spent more than two 
years in London and knows the London Poles 
rather well. But at the same time he must say that 
there are good people among them. Comrade 
Stalin makes the remark that one can find good 
people everywhere, even among the bushmen.” 
Harriman was not content to let the issue rest and 
asked what was the solution to this problem. “In 
future either the Mikolajczyk government will be 
changed or a new democratic government will 
emerge in Poland,” Stalin snapped. All of 
Harriman's attempts to find out how this new 
government might come about, whether
65 Memorandum of Staff Meeting, February 15, 1944, 
WAHP, CF, Cont. 171.
Mikolajczyk's representatives might be part of it 
and so forth were met with the non-committal 
“that will depend on the situation” or “it's too 
early to tell.” The Kremlin master spoke out more 
definitely regarding the British Prime Minister's 
attempts at mediation: “Churchill will not be able 
to do anything with the Poles. The Poles are 
deceiving Churchill.”66
Despite Stalin's harsh tone, Harriman 
continued to maintain a cautious optimism. In a 
draft of a dispatch that ultimately was not sent to 
the President, written soon after this meeting in the 
Kremlin, he writes: “Stalin is basically right. 
There is no evidence that he is unwilling to allow 
an independent Poland to emerge. I urge. that we 
don't allow our relationship with the Soviet 
government to be embroiled by the Poles.”67
Such was Harriman's frame of mind when he 
set out for Washington in May to report on 
developments and for briefings. He stopped in 
London on the way and had to make Churchill, 
angered by Stalin's “ingratitude” for his mediation 
in the Polish question, see reason. The Prime 
Minister spoke of his “great achievement” of 
succeeding in winning over the Mikolajczyk 
government to recognize the Curzon Line as the 
temporary administrative eastern border of Poland. 
And “what did he get for all this? Insults from 
Stalin—a barbarian, etc., etc.,” Harriman records 
in his diary, not without irony.68
In Washington, the Ambassador met with the 
President who promised to nudge Mikolajczyk at 
their upcoming meeting to replace Sosnowski and 
one or two other obstinate members of his cabinet, 
as well as to try to downplay the Polish question in 
the approaching election campaign.69
Harriman presented a more detailed report to 
the State Department administration on May 10th. 
The general tone of his report is thoroughly 
optimistic: “Our relations with the Soviet 
government are constantly becoming more solid in 
spite of a number of superficial difficulties and 
some more fundamental ones. While cautioning 
against harboring illusions about “democracy in 
Russia,” the Ambassador at the same time 
emphasized that “Stalin and his government do not 
wish to foment revolutions along their borders or 
to cause disorders which would threaten
66 Transcript of the conversation between I. V. Stalin 
and U.S. Ambassador Harriman, March 3, 1944, AP RF, 
f. 45, op. 1, d. 377, ll. 41-46.
67 WAHP, CF, Cont. 172.
68 Dinner with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street, 
May 2, 1944, ibid.
69 Meeting and Conversation of May 17, 1944, ibid.
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international stability.” This also applied to 
Poland, where the U.S. position, in Harriman's 
opinion, should be “to stand on the sidelines and to 
make it clear to the Russians that we expect them 
to permit the Poles to establish a government of 
their own choosing, but not to deviate from the 
principle that the Poles must make their peace with 
Russia.”
Harriman confirmed that he viewed the “Czech 
model” to be the best of all possible in Eastern 
Europe, but with one significant proviso, namely, 
that “with the view to checking the spread of 
Communism” in Eastern and Central Europe, the 
U.S. must render assistance to the democratic 
governments of the countries in this region, above 
all, in the economic sphere.70
Harriman's return to Moscow coincided with 
the peak of Soviet-American military cooperation. 
On June 2, 1944, after a successful bombing 
mission of targets in Romania, 64 U.S. Air Force 
bombers landed on the Poltava airfield—the new 
phase of shuttle-bombings had begun, which the 
Americans nicknamed Frantic Joe, in honor of 
Stalin. While watching the well-balanced wedge 
formation of the silver-winged aircrafts, the 
reserved Harriman, as his daughter Kathleen who 
was with him would write home, “was moved as 
never before in his life.”71 Harriman himself in his 
dispatch to Roosevelt wrote: “All of us here, 
Russians and Americans alike, were thrilled to see 
General Eaker with his bomber force to land on 
Soviet bases.”72 In addition to the purely military 
aims, Frantic Joe also had political goals—to 
demonstrate Allied solidarity and show the Soviet 
people the might and friendliness of the U.S. Air 
Force, as well as to create a precedent for granting 
the Americans airbases on the Primorye Territory 
and in the Far East.73
On June 6, 1944, the Allies landed at 
Normandy. Stalin, who received Harriman several 
days later, expressed his admiration for the Allied 
operation in unusually exalted tones (later 
expanded for his interview in Pravda): “The 
history of warfare does not know another similar 
enterprise in breadth of concept, grandeur of scale 
and skill of execution.” For a time, the American 
soldiers and diplomats were real heroes in
Moscow: they were hoisted aloft on the street, 
loaded down with presents at receptions, and 
treated in restaurants. “It is funny,” Kathleen 
Harriman wrote home, “the way the public gives 
us complete credit for the invasion, not the British 
or Canadians.”74 And the Ambassador reported to 
Churchill's wife, Clementine, that “life in Moscow 
is much more pleasant this summer. The sun has 
been shining brightly both actually and 
figuratively since the momentous events.”75
The Soviet military command supported 
Operation Overlord by participating in the 
Bodyguard Plan, according to which they planned 
to disinform the Germans as to the time and place 
of the Allied landing at Normandy, as well as by 
mounting a powerful offensive on the Eastern 
front, which pinned down the Weirmacht's 
primary forces. Stalin's fulfillment of this promise 
made in Teheran, Harriman would later recall, was 
“of supreme importance in the psychology of our 
military. The fact that he kept his word on this 
convinced a number of our military leaders of the 
sincerity of his word, Eisenhower particularly.”76 
The Big Three's military and strategic cooperation 
had reached its zenith.
Now even the situation with the Polish 
question still seemed reparable. Although the 
Kremlin on the eve of the liberation of Poland had 
already begun to create that same “democratic” 
(i.e., pro-Soviet) government to spite the London 
Poles, about which Stalin had hinted to Harriman 
in March, the leaders of the Polish National 
Committee made quite a good impression on the 
Ambassador. “They satisfied me,” Harriman 
reported to Washington after the first meeting with 
E. Osubka-Morawski and his colleagues, “that 
they aren't Soviet agents and that they are anxious 
to get the backing and assistance not only of the 
Soviet government, but of the British and 
ourselves as well.”77 *
The Kremlin's real position was harsher than it 
appeared to either Roosevelt or Harriman. 
Although there was not talk yet of the 
Sovietization of Poland (the Resolution of the 
State Defense Committee, dated July 31, 1944, 
stated: “the Soviet system is not to be 
introduced., the churches are not to be touched”),
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the Kremlin was counting on pro-Soviet forces and 
an irreconcilable conflict with the Home Army and 
other pro-London organizations. That same 
Resolution of the State Defense Committee 
directed that “no governing bodies, including those 
that represent themselves as organs of the Polish 
emigre ‘government' (in London) are to be 
recognized except the organs of the Polish 
National Council. Bear in mind that those 
persons who represent themselves as 
representatives of the Polish emigre ‘government' 
in London, among whom a number of Hitler's 
agents have been found, should be regarded as 
imposters and should be dealt with as adventurers” 
(the words in italics were added by Molotov for 
emphasis—V.P.).78 However, in an effort to 
observe the “democratic” niceties and not annoy 
the Allies too much, Stalin was prepared to dilute 
the “Lublin Poles” with a few representatives of 
the London government. It was precisely just such 
a deal that he and Molotov attempted to force on 
Mikolajczyk's delegation, which came to Moscow 
in late July for negotiations with the Soviet 
leadership. Mikolajczyk did not give in and his 
first talks with B. Bierut and his team did not yield 
tangible results, but he left Moscow “much more 
hopeful” (in the words of Harriman in his dispatch 
to Washington) regarding a settlement, in part by 
Stalin's personal promise to airlift assistance to 
those taking part in the Warsaw uprising that had 
begun on August 1st. In his final dispatch on the 
results of the Soviet-Polish negotiations in 
Moscow (which Harriman carefully monitored 
through meetings with both Molotov and 
Mikolajczyk), he reported that “there is no doubt 
that the Soviet Government wants to see a 
settlement now”79 on Poland by means of creating 
a coalition government and recommended 
increasing pressure on Mikolajczyk from London 
and Washington. Roosevelt was delighted with 
this “pleasant news on Soviet-Polish 
conversations.”80
But just a few days later the situation with 
Poland changed dramatically. On August 15, 1944, 
Harriman received a harsh denial from Vyshinsky 
in response to the U.S. request to allow Allied 
planes to make a landing in Poltava after their
78 Resolution of the State Defense Committee, July 31, 
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79 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1315.
80 Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete 
Correspondence, edited by W. Kimball (London, 1984), 
vol. 3, p. 273.
flight from Great Britain and airlifting cargo for 
the insurgents in Warsaw. (The Royal Air Force 
had begun these flights on August 9th, but they did 
not have sufficient fuel to return to their home 
airbases.) Thus the Soviet Union not only refused, 
despite Stalin's promise to lend assistance to the 
Poles, but also was not allowing the Allies do so. 
Harriman and Kerr requested an immediate 
meeting with Molotov, but were received by the 
same Vyshinsky, who in response to the 
Ambassador's questions and protests would 
merely repeat: “The Soviet government does not 
wish to encourage undertakings by adventurers 
that will be used against itself.”81 In his report on 
this conversation, Harriman, shocked by what had 
taken place, wrote to the President: “I am for the 
first time since coming to Moscow gravely 
concerned by the attitude of the Soviet 
government. If the position of the Soviet 
government is correctly reflected by Vyshinsky, its 
refusal is based on ruthless political 
considerations.” 82 Harriman appealed to Roosevelt 
to send Stalin a serious warning, but the President 
took a wait-and-see position.
On August 17th, the ambassadors were finally 
received by Molotov, who by this time already 
knew from Antonov, the chief of the General Staff, 
about the disastrous situation of the English 
airmen who were forced to parachute out of their 
planes over Polish and Soviet territory after their 
raids on Warsaw. Nevertheless, the People's 
Commissar firmly maintained the position taken 
by Stalin the day before in his reply to Churchill 
and Mikolajczyk: “The Soviet government 
believes the Warsaw enterprise to be a sham” and 
“does not wish to assume responsibility for it, 
including the responsibility for aircraft which will 
be sent to render assistance to Warsaw.”83 
Harriman, who had assumed the role of the Allies' 
main representative, brought to bear all the 
arguments at his disposal, beginning with Stalin's 
promise and the undermining of the position of 
Mikolajczyk among his colleagues to the 
“unnecessary deaths” of many American and 
British airmen and public opinion in the U.S. and 
England. “The refusal to assist the Poles now 
engaged in this battle in Warsaw will never be 
understood in the U.S., no matter what the 
mistakes of the leaders of these Poles have been,” 
runs the Soviet transcript of this conversation, 
prepared by V. Pavlov. “He, Harriman, is certain
81 Conversation between Kerr, Harriman and 
Vyshinsky, August 13, 1944, WAHP, CF, Cont. 173.
82 Special Envoy, p. 340.
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that if Molotov were to examine thoroughly all 
these factors, he would reconsider his decision.” 
(“Harriman delivered these last words,” Pavlov 
adds, “in a highly agitated voice.”)84
However, Molotov not only dispassionately 
dismissed all of Harriman's arguments on Poland, 
but also added yet another piece of bad news, 
namely, the Soviet government's desire to “return 
the airfields [engaged in Operation Frantic] to 
Soviet troops, because they were not being 
adequately utilized.” This unexpected 
communication, which sounded like a threat to 
link the shuttle-bombings with the Polish question, 
exhausted the reserves of Harriman's patience. 
Despite the heavy casualties sustained by the 
American air detachment in Ukraine as a result of 
German bombings in late June, the U.S. military 
command was counting on making use of these 
airfields in the future in connection with the 
ensuing transfer of airbases to the Primorye. On its 
part, the Soviet partners in the shuttle-bombing 
mission believed it possible to agree to an increase 
in the presence of the U.S. Air Force in Ukraine to 
4 airforce detachments (i.e., 2,000 crew members) 
and give them one more airbase.85 Therefore, 
without even having concrete instructions on this 
point, Harriman replied with a very serious 
warning: “If the Americans are denied Soviet 
airfields, this will have catastrophic consequences 
for matters of cooperation between our 
countries.” (Pavlov again notes the 
Ambassador's “agitated voice” and “irritation.”) 
“There were no grounds for Harriman to have been 
so agitated,” observed the People's Commissar as 
he calmly brought the discussion to a close.”86
Harriman was indeed “absorbed by 
indignation,” as he wrote to General F. 
Anderson.87 The reasons for such an emotional 
reaction apparently stem from the shock of seeing 
Stalin's treachery revealed for the first time with 
such clarity. “The one solid faith I have had was 
the validity of Stalin's word,” he writes in a 
dispatch to the President that went unsent. “He has 
now broken his promise to Mikolajczyk within 
three days and without any apparent cause.”) The 
cynicism of Stalin, who just recently had accused 
the Polish underground of an unwillingness “to 
fight the Germans,” and who then later (in that 
same meeting with Mikolajczyk on August 9th)
expressed ostentatious sympathy for the foolish 
insurgents (“The Germans will simply slaughter all 
the Poles. It's a pity about these Poles”88), now 
displayed gloating indifference both for their 
extermination and for Allied appeals for 
assistance, all of which had shocked even the 
thick-skinned Harriman. The Warsaw insurrection 
became a moment of truth for him and forced him 
to view in a new light not only the methods but 
also the goals of Stalin's policies. In that same 
draft of a dispatch to the President he writes that 
the Polish question, important in and of itself, 
might herald the same merciless policies in other 
quarters. This accounts for his recommendation to 
the White House and the State Department that 
“Marshal Stalin should be made to understand that 
if the Soviet government continues such a policy, 
the belief of the American public in the chances of 
success of postwar cooperation and of world 
security organization would be profoundly 
shaken.”89
Neither Roosevelt nor the State Department, 
however, responded to Harriman's sounding of the 
alarm. The U.S. Air Force command was skeptical 
of the effectiveness of assisting Warsaw from the 
air, at the same time fearful of the future for the 
shuttle-bombing operations (called into question 
by Molotov), which as the State Department 
instructed the Ambassador “shouldn't in any way 
be allowed to be imperiled by [the Warsaw] 
question.” It was recommended that Harriman 
change his tune, because “as a result of your 
presentations our chief purpose has already been 
achieved.”90
The Ambassador was forced to submit, 
although, as he wrote in reply, he found “it 
difficult to understand how it can be considered 
that our purpose has been achieved.” Hoping to 
influence the White House, he turned to Hopkins 
with the request that he be recalled to Washington 
for urgent consultations and laid out a new, 
tougher policy toward the USSR: “They have 
misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them 
as a sign of weakness and acceptance of their 
policies. Unless we take issue with the present 
policy there is every indication that the Soviet 
Union will become a world bully wherever their 
interests are involved. I am not going to propose 
any drastic action, but a firm but friendly quid pro
84 Ibid., l. 18.
85 Nikitin to Molotov, June 29, 1944, AVP RF, f. 06, 
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quo attitude.” From this moment this formula for 
relations with Moscow became Harriman's secret 
motto, but Hopkins advised him against coming to 
Washington for the time being.
The situation around Warsaw became 
somewhat less tense, when on September 9th— 
already after the crushing defeat of the insurgents' 
main forces—the Soviets finally granted 
permission to the Allies to use the Ukrainian 
airfields, and on September 13th they began their 
own air missions to Warsaw. At the same time, the 
Soviet command, following instructions (as 
Antonov reported to Molotov91) “continued to 
evade” discussion of the Polish situation with the 
Allies. Stalin took upon himself this discussion 
during his meeting with Harriman and Kerr on 
September 23rd. First, Stalin recognized the 
grounds for the insurgents' actions and spoke in 
detail about the problems of rendering them 
military assistance.92 “The Marshal,” Harriman 
reported to the President, “showed concern and 
understanding for the Poles in Warsaw and none of 
the vindictiveness previously evidenced.”
This turnaround by the great mystifier puzzled 
Harriman, who now was prepared to ascribe part 
of the blame to Molotov or the KGB for 
misinforming the Commander in Chief about the 
situation in Warsaw and the Anglo-American 
protests. As he would later recall, “To me nothing 
could excuse his outrageous denial of help for so 
very long. But the episode again underlined the 
importance of getting to Stalin directly on matters 
of importance.”93
The settlement of the Warsaw incident and the 
partial rehabilitation of Stalin himself in the eyes 
of the Ambassador did not alter his new appraisal 
of the dangers lurking in Soviet policies. 
Moreover, the influence of Harriman's new deputy 
at the Moscow Embassy, George Kennan, and his 
extremely gloomy analysis of the situation 
evidently played a role here. Convinced of the 
predominance of “dreams of empire” over 
“thoughts of international collaboration” in the 
Kremlin's thinking, Kennan believed that with the 
opening of the second front the necessity of 
appeasing the West had grown weaker, which 
made way for the “resultant bluntness of Soviet 
policy,” so clearly revealed during the Warsaw 
insurrection. The Kremlin's goal, continued 
Kennan in his analytic essay for Harriman and the
State Department, was to establish control over 
Eastern and Central Europe; the methods may not 
include full “Communization” of these countries, 
but they will always lead to their complete 
subordination to the will of Moscow. In 
connection with the Warsaw events, Kennan 
proposed that harsh retaliatory measures be taken, 
including the cessation of Lend-Lease.94
Harriman did not go as far in his analysis and 
recommendations, but he began to have doubts 
about the possibility of limiting Soviet expansion 
by the likes of the Monroe Doctrine and an open 
sphere of influence, in which he had recently 
believed himself. As recently as September 18th, in 
a draft of recommendations to the State 
Department he had proposed determining with 
London the sphere of the West's vital interests in 
Europe; then “we must make it plain to the 
Russians in practical ways and in a friendly but 
firm manner where this line lies. to reach an 
effective understanding as to how far we each can
go.”95
But only a few days later, in answering Hull's 
inquiry on the tendencies of Soviet policies, 
Harriman was noticeably more careful regarding 
the viability of such a partition:
What frightens me, however, is that when a 
country begins to extend its influence by 
strong-hand methods beyond its borders 
under the guise of security it is difficult to see 
how a line can be drawn. If the policy is 
accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to 
penetrate her immediate neighbors for 
security, penetration of the next immediate 
neighbor becomes at a certain time equally 
logical. At the present time, I believe, they 
certainly expect us to give them a free hand 
with their Western neighbors.
Harriman further noted that instead of giving 
them carte-blanche, the United States must clearly 
register its disagreement with Soviet policy and in 
the most important instances make use of real 
leverage (for example, assistance in postwar 
reconstruction) in order to force the Kremlin “to 
conform to our concepts.” He ends by noting, “In 
such cases I am satisfied that in the last analysis 
Stalin will back down. We have seen him reverse
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his decision in connection with aid to the 
insurgents in Warsaw.”96
Thus by the fall of 1944, Harriman's general 
position had taken shape and he will be guided by 
it until the end of the war—quid pro quo, the goal 
of limiting Soviet expansion coupled with the still- 
present hope to introduce Western standards of 
behavior in the Soviet Union by the stick-and- 
carrot method.
Nevertheless, his special, personal relationship 
with the Kremlin remained in force. In early 
October, Molotov even informed the Ambassador 
of the Soviet government's desire to confer high 
honors upon him and Lord Beaverbrook in 
connection with the anniversary of the signing of 
the Moscow Protocol of 1941. Harriman politely 
declined, citing his government's negative view of 
American officials who are directly in charge of 
administering supplies to the USSR receiving 
Soviet honors.97
In October, Harriman once again, as in 1942, 
had occasion to accompany Churchill during his 
negotiations with Stalin. The British Prime 
Minister had come to Moscow to bargain over the 
Balkans and Poland, and Roosevelt (prompted by 
Hopkins) decided he wanted his own observer 
present at these talks so that he would be fully 
informed and at the same time not have his hands 
tied by Anglo-Soviet agreements. For his part, 
Churchill had arranged with Roosevelt for one-on- 
one meetings with Stalin, since, as he wrote the 
President, “it is often under such conditions that 
the best progress is made.”98
The most progress was made precisely at the 
first meeting tete-a-tete between Churchill and 
Stalin on October 9th, namely, the famous 
“percentage agreement” on partitioning the spheres 
of influence between the two powers in the 
Balkans, by which Churchill sought to maintain 
English predominance in Greece and influence in 
Yugoslavia, in exchange for Soviet domination in 
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The conversation 
between the two old imperialists was so cynical 
that even many years later the Foreign Office 
published only a retouched transcript, while the 
Soviet version remains closed to this day. 
Although not invited to this private meeting, 
Harriman still managed to piece together from 
talks with Churchill and Eden the gist of this
transaction “on the spheres of influence,” and he 
immediately informed Roosevelt.
That same day, October 10th, Churchill and 
Stalin composed a telegram to Roosevelt regarding 
the progress of their negotiations. The draft of this 
telegram contained a single sentence on the 
“coordination of policies with regard to the Balkan 
countries that takes into account the differences in 
our obligations to them.” The last phrase seemed 
to Stalin to be too transparent a hint at spheres of 
influence. He was ardently seconded by Harriman 
(present at the lunch where the discussion arose), 
who reminded them of the President's desire to 
leave all the most important questions for the 
consideration of the Big Three. As Harriman 
reported to Roosevelt, “Stalin said he was glad to 
hear this and, reaching behind the Prime Minister's 
back, shook my hand.”99 100A day later, Harriman 
found Churchill in bed with his message to Stalin, 
which developed their “percentage bargain.” After 
familiarizing himself with its contents, the 
Ambassador warned the Prime Minister that 
Roosevelt and Hull would certainly dissociate 
themselves from such a document. Churchill
heeded the diplomat's advice and did not send the
100message.
Nevertheless, dividing up the Balkans on paper 
proved to be easier than persuading the London 
Poles to cooperate with Moscow. Mikolajczyk had 
been invited to come to Moscow. Despite the 
double pressure of Stalin and Churchill, he 
obstinately refused to accept the Curzon Line, 
which entailed Poland losing Lvov and the 
coalfields in eastern Galicia; moreover, he did not 
concede to the demands of the Polish National 
Council to be given a clear majority in the new 
government, which reflected the Soviet position as 
well, while Churchill insisted on an equal 
representation of “Lublin” and “London” Poles.
In separate talks with Churchill and Eden, 
Harriman spoke out in favor of a swift resolution 
of the Polish question in Moscow that would make 
use of the presence of the English, since time was 
working against the Londoners: “The longer the 
London Poles had control, the more the pattern of 
a subservient relationship to Moscow would be 
cemented and the deeper would be the conflict 
among the Poles within Poland.”101 Churchill 
agreed and stepped up the pressure on
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Mikolajczyk: “Unless you accept the frontier, you 
are out of business forever! The Russians will 
sweep through your country, and your people will 
be liquidated.”102
In his meeting with Mikolajczyk, Stalin acted 
much more subtly. While masterfully noting the 
Pole's legal arguments regarding the rights to 
western Ukraine from time immemorial (“legally 
all of Poland belonged to Russia until the last 
world war”), he at the same time tried to calm his 
interlocutor with his vision of Poland's future as a 
democratic and even “capitalist” state.103 
Mikolajczyk, however, did not yield either to 
promises or threats and merely agreed to the 
continuation of negotiations.
The main outcome for Harriman was that with 
Churchill's support he and General Deane had 
finally received answers from Stalin to questions 
that had troubled the Americans regarding the 
USSR's entry into the war with Japan. Stalin 
pledged to begin the war with Japan within three 
months after Germany's surrender, explaining that 
it would require that much time to transport the 
necessary supplies via the Trans-Siberian railroad. 
He also stated that “it would be necessary to 
clarify the political aspects of the war with Japan. 
The Soviet Union must know what it will be 
fighting for.” The Americans were also pleased 
that Stalin confirmed the Soviet Union's 
willingness to grant the U.S. access to airfields in 
the Primorye and the port of Petropavlovsk- 
Kamchatksky. On October 16th, Stalin presented 
Harriman with the Soviet request for supplies in 
exchange for the offensive on Japan, totaling 
approximately 1 billion dollars.104 The second of 
Harriman's long-term missions was nearing its 
resolution.
Churchill's visit passed under conditions of 
Allied solidarity. Stalin showed the Prime Minister 
the maximum amount of attention: he appeared 
with him in the government box in the Bolshoi 
Theater (where, according to Kathleen Harriman, 
they were greeted with thunderous applause); for 
the first time ever Stalin attended a dinner at the 
British Embassy; and at the end of the visit he saw 
his honored guest off at the airport. Present at 
almost all of the negotiations between the two 
leaders, Harriman once again felt like a participant
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in great events, and thought only of being in the 
company of the powerful of this world. Many 
years later, George Kennan would recall with a 
sense of injury how he had waited for several 
hours for that same dinner at the British Embassy 
to end so that he might at least present his wife 
(the Embassy's “first lady” after all) to Churchill 
and Stalin, but Harriman was so preoccupied by 
his proximity to the leaders that he walked by with 
them and did not even notice his deputy.105
The Ambassador's sense of self-importance 
was no secret to his other colleagues as well, 
including the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald 
Kerr. It was during this same period that Soviet 
intelligence intercepted his perceptive and ironic 
appraisal of Harriman, which, as I have managed 
to establish, was contained in the Ambassador's 
annual report on his colleagues in the Moscow 
diplomatic corps. As Kerr noted in his report, 
Harriman “puts his whole heart,” into his mission, 
“and by no means in vain. But the putting of it 
gives the inescapable impression that he is always 
on the make and evokes memories of the late 
Theodore Roosevelt, of whom it was said that he 
liked to be the baby at the christening, the bride at 
the wedding and the corpse at the funeral. Mr. 
Harriman has the same likings and they lead him 
into ways that it is sometimes embarrassing to 
watch. Thus he seems for ever to be troubled by 
the importance of being important (he must, as it 
were, always have a front seat) and by the fear that 
he might miss something of consequence and so a 
chance that might profit him.”106
Immediately following Churchill's departure, 
Harriman set off for Washington to report to the 
President. He saw Roosevelt five times, including 
two private lunch meetings (private save the 
President's nephews and his dogs). They managed 
to discuss all the major issues of American-Soviet 
relations. Harriman informed the President in 
detail on the negotiations between Stalin and 
Churchill on the Balkans, but was to learn that “the 
President consistently shows very little interest in 
Eastern European matters except as they affect 
sentiment in America.”
Poland proved to be the exception and 
Harriman was alarmed to see that in an attempt to 
untie the Lvov knot the President happened upon 
such “fantastic ideas” as declaring Lvov to be an
105 Transcript of a conversation with George Kennan on 
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open Polish city on the territory of Soviet Ukraine, 
or conducting a plebiscite on its status ten years 
after the war's end, or inviting Roosevelt to 
assume the role of arbiter in resolving the border 
disputes between Poland and the USSR. As 
Harriman recorded in his notes on these 
conversations, the President “has no conception 
that they have a vital interest in their own manner 
on their own terms. They will never leave them to 
the President or anyone else to arbitrate.” In any 
event, Harriman managed to persuade the 
President of Stalin's determination to resolve the 
issue of Poland's border without waiting for 
arbitration or plebiscites. The President answered 
that he would not raise objections to the Curzon 
Line, provided the Poles, Russians and British 
would agree, but that he was prepared to put in a 
word to Stalin about Lvov. The Ambassador's 
warnings about the danger of pro-Soviet puppet 
regimes being set up in Eastern Europe did not 
make much of an impression on Roosevelt, who 
back in May had disconcerted Harriman by his 
acknowledgment “that he didn't care whether the 
countries bordering Russia became 
communized.”107
The President was much more passionate in his 
discussions with Harriman about the situation in 
the Far East. He emphasized that “the defeat of 
Japan without the aid of Russia would be 
extremely difficult and costly,” and authorized 
Harriman to find out what political price Stalin had 
set for the USSR's entry into the war. Harriman 
answered that he did not foresee any particular 
surprises here—the discussion would likely center 
on the repeal of the conditions of the Portsmouth 
Treaty of 1905, on ports and free access to transit 
on the China-Manchuria railways. The biggest 
difficulties with the USSR, the Ambassador added, 
would arise in connection with the political aspects 
of the Chinese settlement. Roosevelt, however, 
was optimistic here as well, believing that the 
goals of the USSR and the U.S. in China in many 
respects were similar: the unification of China and 
the liberalization of its regime.
The President showed a lot of interest in the 
next meeting with Stalin, and instructed Harriman 
to try to organize it early in the coming year 
somewhat more removed from Soviet shores.108
In his presentation to a meeting of State 
Department officials, Harriman found a more
107 Notes on the Conversations with the President, May 
1944, WAHP, CF, Cont. 175.
108 Memorandum of Conversations with the President
during the Trip to Washington, October 21-November
19, 1944, WAHP, CF, Cont. 175.
rewarding audience for his recommendations on 
Eastern Europe. “The first line of defense” against 
the Kremlin's foreign policy, he explained, was 
the cooperation with the U.S. and Great Britain 
that would be necessary for the restoration and 
development of the Soviet economy. The second 
line was “to ensure that the states along their 
borders shall not unite with foreign aggressors.” 
This line, Harriman elaborated, could easily turn 
“imperialist” by installing political regimes on the 
Soviet model in Eastern Europe, but timely 
interference on the part of the U.S. could avert the 
transformation of this tendency, not yet firmly 
consolidated, into a routine mode of behavior. 
“Our basic weapon should not be the threat to 
withhold economic assistance but the threat to 
refrain from cooperation in the maintenance of 
general security.”109 *
On his flight back to Moscow, Harriman 
stopped over in London to continue negotiations 
with Mikolajczyk, but the latter informed him of 
his resignation, which had been brought about by 
his inability to influence his cabinet to accept the 
Soviet conditions. The departure of Mikolajczyk 
even further complicated the resolution of the 
Polish problem; meanwhile, in December, Stalin 
had warned the Allies of the Soviet Union's 
forthcoming recognition of the Provisional 
Government in Poland, which took place on 
January 5th, despite protests from Roosevelt and 
Churchill.
On December 14th, Harriman secured an 
interview with Stalin in order to receive an answer 
regarding Soviet claims on Japan. Stalin brought in 
a large map from an adjoining room and showed 
him what was involved: the return of southern 
Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union, a 
lease on Port Arthur and Dairen, along with the 
adjacent territory, as well as the railroads in 
Manchuria. In the course of answering the 
Ambassador's questions, Stalin confirmed the 
USSR's consent to maintaining the status quo in 
Mongolia and the observance of the sovereign 
rights of China and Manchuria. This coincided 
with the Embassy's expectations, apart from the 
item of Port Arthur, which the Americans wanted 
to use as a buttress in their “open door” policy in 
Manchuria. Harriman, therefore, tried to dispute 
this point, reminding Stalin that in Teheran 
Roosevelt had spoken of his wish that this port be 
open to all sides. “This can be discussed,” Stalin
109 Remarks by Mr. Harriman, Minutes, Department of 
State Policy Committee, October 25, 1944, NA, RG 59, 




agreed evasively.110 Not long before this meeting 
the U.S. had approved the Soviet request for Lend- 
Lease deliveries in the Far East. The USSR's long- 
awaited entry into the war with Japan was 
becoming a reality.
Early in the new year of 1945, another of 
Harriman's missions—postwar credits for the 
USSR—got an unexpected boost. This was 
preceded by three months of negotiation in 
Washington and arduous interdepartmental 
coordination in Moscow. The American plan for a 
credit agreement was presented to Stepanov, the 
deputy of the People's Commissar for Foreign 
Trade, on September 8, 1944, and with minor 
reservations was deemed “completely acceptable” 
by both the Commissariats for Foreign Trade and 
Foreign Affairs.111 However, on September 21st at 
a meeting with Molotov, N. A. Voznesensky, the 
chairman of the State Planning Commission, 
criticized the plan, declaring (according to notes 
taken by A. I. Mikoyan) that “the proposed 
American credit is not to our advantage.” Mikoyan 
asked Molotov to obtain from Voznesensky his 
objections in writing, but the People's Commissar 
deflected this proposal with a resolution addressed 
to Mikoyan, Voznesensky, Beria and Malenkov: 
“In my opinion, Comrade Mikoyan should not take 
offense at criticism.”112 Further agreements and 
adjustments followed, as a result of which toward 
the end of September the Foreign Trade 
Commissariat had prepared a new plan that 
stipulated (evidently in response to the criticism 
from Gosplan) an approximate total of 920 million 
dollars of credit (provided the war ended by April 
1, 1945, and taking into account the Lend-Lease 
deliveries of manufacturing equipment, as 
stipulated by the 4th Protocol). On the basis of this 
the NKID prepared a response to the Americans, 
which was drawn up using a politely obliging tone 
that emphasized the enormous problems the USSR 
would face in its postwar reconstruction and that 
requested an allocation of 1 billion dollars in 1945, 
and another 2 billion in 1946-47. The 
corresponding plan of the State Defense 
Committee's Resolution “On the Credit
110 FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 
(Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 378; Sovetsko-
amerikanskie otnosheniia..., vol. 2, p. 273.
111 Experts in the Foreign Affairs Ministry found that 
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advantageous than the conditions of other credit 
agreements concluded by the USSR” (Gerashchenko, 
Arkad'ev to Molotov, September 20, 1944, AVP RF, f. 
06, op. 6, p. 18, d. 178, ll. 38-41.
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Agreement with the U.S.” was approved by the 
Politburo on December 5, 1944.113 The subsequent 
fate of this document has not yet been traced in the 
archives, so it is difficult to say how a month later 
it had turned into a demand for 6 billion dollars, 
still couched in terms of doing the Americans a 
favor: “In light of frequent statements made by 
U.S. representatives regarding the desirability of 
receiving large Soviet orders for the transition and 
war periods, the Government of the USSR deems 
it possible to supply orders on a long-term credit 
basis in the amount of 6 billion dollars.” That is 
the preamble to the Soviet government's 
Memorandum, delivered to Harriman by Molotov 
on January 4th. The concrete conditions of the 
credit to be granted that follow in this document 
differ in some respects from the terms earlier 
agreed upon (for example, the percentage rate was 
reduced from 2 3/8 percent to 2 % percent, and the 
discount on prices for war-time contracts was set 
at a rate of 20 percent instead of 5 percent.114
Nevertheless, after recovering from Molotov's 
demands, which the Ambassador characterized as 
“unconditional,” Harriman recommended that the 
State Department seriously consider the proposal 
and “entirely disregard the unconventional 
character of the document and the 
unreasonableness of its terms.” As before, 
Harriman did not call into question the USSR's 
enormous interest in receiving the credit (which 
evidently the unduly insulting tone was meant to 
conceal) and suggested that it be tied to “their 
behavior in international matters.”115 The State 
Department agreed with this approach, but decided 
to save this as leverage in the future “for use in 
connection with the many other political and 
economic problems which will arise between our 
two countries.”116 Roosevelt, despite Harriman's 
reminders, also decided not to raise the question of 
credits at the upcoming conference in Yalta. As 
Roosevelt explained to Secretary of the Treasury, 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who had come out against 
using the credit for political means, “I think it is 
very important that we hold this back and don't 
give them any promises of finance until we get 
what we want.”117 *
113 Molotov, Mikoian, Beriia, Malenkov, Voznesenskii 
to Stalin, December 5, 1944, AP RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 295,
ll. 197-200, 201-3.
114 AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 45, d. 703, l. 3.
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In the course of the preparations for the Yalta 
Conference, it fell to Harriman's lot, as is 
customary with ambassadors, to arrange a number 
of organizational and technical issues—everything 
from coming to an agreement on the agenda to 
buying (at Roosevelt's request) some “wonderful 
Russian champagne” and seeing to the 
construction of special ramps to accommodate the 
President's wheelchair at the airfield and all the 
conference's major locations.118
In late January, Harriman approached I. 
Maisky, who was responsible for preparing the 
USSR's reparations program, to find out about the 
preparations for the Yalta Conference. Harriman, 
Maisky reported to Molotov, was “particularly 
interested” in the sum total of reparations and the 
number of German workers to be removed to the 
USSR. The deputy of the People's Commissar 
“demurred” from naming exact figures, but “gave 
Harriman to understand that it was a matter of 
millions of people. That did not surprise him and 
did not elicit any negative reaction,” Maisky was 
pleased to report. “On the contrary, he was of the 
opinion that the utilization of German labor in the 
USSR might greatly help to ease unemployment in 
postwar Germany.” Harriman also supported the 
Soviet plans to limit heavy industry in Germany to 
purely domestic needs: Germany, he said, can 
satisfy its export requirements through agriculture 
and light industry. “Harriman later asked about 
what would be done with the workers who would 
be out of work as a result of the reductions in 
heavy industry,” but before Maisky had managed 
to deal with the difficulty that had arisen, 
Harriman “there and then interrupted himself and 
with an obvious sigh of relief said, ‘Well, of 
course, you will be taking a large number of 
unemployed German workers to the Soviet Union 
for this initial period, and later on everything will 
gradually become settled.'” “In conclusion,” 
Maisky reported, “Harriman remarked that the 
solution to the reparations issue in the formulation 
that we have given it seems less problematic than 
he had earlier thought.”119
In the way of preparations for Yalta, Harriman 
also had an interesting conversation with P. 
Sudoplatov, a representative from Soviet 
intelligence, concerning security and surveillance 
of the Western allies. The intelligence officer 
invited Harriman to the Aragvi restaurant and, 
after having no success extracting any useful 
information from his guest, he decided to
intimidate the Ambassador by hinting at 
compromising information the “organs” (i.e., 
NKVD) supposedly had regarding the 
Ambassador's daughter, Kathleen. As a matter of 
fact, the Lyubyanka did not have any such material 
(as counter-intelligence agents who worked the 
U.S. Embassy later admitted), although on more 
than one occasion they had “introduced” her to 
handsome young “pilots” and “sailors.”120 
Sudoplatov's “alarm” most probably was meant 
for Kathleen herself—“a perceptive and sociable” 
woman, who annoyed Soviet counter-intelligence 
with her movements in the highest ranking circles, 
where she (so it was believed) had access to very 
valuable information.121 Harriman acted as though 
he had not understood what Sudoplatov was 
talking about and soon afterwards left for Yalta, 
accompanied by Kathleen.
The minutes of the Yalta Conference do not 
show traces of Harriman's active involvement in 
the debates of the “Big Three.” He played, 
however, an important role behind the scenes in 
preparing the agreement on the USSR's entry into 
the war with Japan, for which he was Roosevelt's 
main confidant. In a meeting with Roosevelt on 
February 8th, Stalin outlined the Soviet maximum 
program on the Far East, which the Americans 
already knew from Harriman's December 
dispatches. Roosevelt spoke out in favor of making 
Dairen and Port Arthur free ports and for joint 
Sino-Soviet control of the railroads in Manchuria 
(instead of leasing them to the Soviet Union). The 
President also emphasized the importance of 
obtaining the Chinese government's assent to these 
understandings. On February 10th, Harriman 
discussed these amendments at a meeting with 
Molotov, who proved to be compliant with the 
majority of the American proposals. On that same 
day another meeting took place between Stalin and 
Roosevelt, with Harriman the only other 
participant, at which the leaders reached an 
agreement on the issue, which was to be fixed the 
next day in a secret agreement. It was so secret that 
Harriman and the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were the only ones to know about it in the 
American delegation. Harriman thought the Soviet 
concessions insufficient and told the President that 
he did not like the vague proviso regarding the 
“pre-eminent interests” of the USSR in Dairen and 
in the administration of the railroad in Manchuria, 
as well as the firmness of the pledge that all these
118 AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7a, p. 57, d. 3, ll. 28-29.
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requirements “shall be unquestionably fulfilled 
after Japan has been defeated.”122 Roosevelt, 
however, preferred not to engage in further 
wrangling on this issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(Marshall, King and Leahy) also did not express 
any objections, leaving Harriman the sole 
opponent (but the Ambassador's dissatisfaction 
with the Yalta agreements on the Far East will 
surface again).
Another issue on which Harriman made 
attempts in Yalta to dispute the Soviet position 
was Poland. At a meeting of the three foreign 
ministers on February 9th, disagreements once 
again broke out in connection with the Soviet draft 
of a declaration that made provision for forming a 
new Polish cabinet from the constituency of the 
Provincial Government. Harriman, supported by 
Stettinius and Eden, insisted on the American 
phrasing (“and from other democratic elements 
within Poland and beyond her borders”), but 
Molotov just as stubbornly defended his plan. As a 
result, after further discussions at the ministerial 
level and the Big Three, a compromise formulation 
was adopted, which stated that the “currently 
functioning Provisional Government in Poland 
must be reorganized on a broader democratic basis 
by the inclusion of democratic figures in Poland as 
well as Poles from abroad.”123 The compromise 
worked more to the advantage of the Soviet 
position, since it did not specify either the numbers 
or individual parameters of the “projected 
reorganization” and made it possible to keep these 
to a minimum. It was no accident that Molotov's 
take on the Yalta proceedings for Soviet 
ambassadors emphasized that “the foundation” for 
the declaration on Poland had been “laid by our 
proposals.”124 Harriman would later reproach 
Roosevelt for the vagueness that had been allowed, 
the consequences of which he will soon confront 
as a member of the Allied commission on the 
formation of the new Polish government.
From Yalta to Potsdam
The Embassy delegation returned to Moscow 
with mixed emotions. The prevailing wisdom held 
that the “Yalta honeymoon” would not last long: 
the optimists aboard the plane made bets with the 
pessimists, like Bohlen, who believed that it was a
matter of days and weeks, not months.125 The 
pessimists proved to be right. The ink on the Yalta 
“Declaration on a Liberated Europe” did not have 
time to dry before arguments broke out among the 
Allies about violations of the agreement. Stalin's 
final words to Molotov regarding this document 
(“We can fulfill it in our own way; the main thing 
is the alignment of forces”)126 were first tested in 
Rumania. Vyshinsky's infamous behavior at his 
audience with King Michael in late February, 
which he concluded by slamming the door and 
walking out, followed by the subsequent hasty 
replacement of Radescu's cabinet with the pro-
Soviet government of Petru Groza strongly 
resonated in Washington and London. “In regard 
to the Rumanian situation,” Roosevelt wrote 
Churchill on March 11th, “Averell has taken up 
and is taking up again the whole question with 
Molotov invoking the Declaration on Liberated
Europe..., but... Rumania is not a good place for a
127test case.”
A true “test case” developed around the Polish 
question and one of the primary diplomatic testing 
grounds of this fight became the Moscow tripartite 
commission (Molotov, Harriman, Kerr), created by 
a resolution of the Yalta Conference. Although the 
commission was designed to play the role of 
neutral mediator and arbiter among the various 
Polish factions, in actual fact both sides—the 
Soviets and the Anglo-Americans—worked at 
pushing for “their own” candidates to be included 
in the future government of Poland. On the Soviet 
side this task had already been clearly formulated 
in Vyshinsky's proposals on the Polish question, 
as reported to Molotov on February 16th, which 
provided for assigning to the other “democratic 
forces” only five places out of twenty, submitting 
all candidates to Bierut and his associates for their 
approval, and from the very beginning discussion 
of all candidates by the commission would be 
conducted with the participation of Bierut, 
Osubka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski. No less 
eloquent are the “remarks by Comrade V. M. 
Molotov,” added in pencil to Vyshinsky's note: 
“Poland—a big deal! But we do not know how the 
governments of Belgium, France, Greece, etc., are 
organized. We have not been asked, although we 
do not say that we like one or another of these 
governments. We have not been informed, since
122 FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 984.
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this is the zone of operations of Anglo-American 
troops” (Molotov's italics—V.P.).128
This heartfelt cry on the part of the Commissar 
of Foreign Affairs (it is later repeated in more 
diplomatic tones by Stalin in his message to 
Churchill, dated April 24th) clearly shows that the 
Kremlin sincerely believed that interference by the 
Anglo-Saxons in Polish affairs was a violation of 
an unwritten rule of Allied relations and viewed 
their Yalta concessions on Poland almost as a 
favor to the Americans. And if that was the case, it 
was imperative to keep the practical consequences 
to a minimum, since the Yalta formulas had made 
that possible. Molotov, as Harriman reported to 
Washington, had seized upon the Russian 
translation of the corresponding point in the Yalta 
documents, which stated that the Commission 
must “consult in Moscow in the first instance with 
members of the present Provisional Government 
and with other Polish democratic leaders,” 
whereas the words “in the first instance” in the 
English version referred to Moscow as the place of 
conducting the first round of consultations. 
Although officially the Anglo-Saxons insisted on 
the necessity of a qualitative reform of the 
government's composition, the Americans on the 
quiet acknowledged (as Roosevelt wrote to 
Churchill on March 29th) that “we placed as clearly 
shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis 
on the Lublin Poles than on the other two 
groups.”129 That is why Harriman and Kerr found 
it difficult to oppose the iron insistence of Stalin 
and Molotov that “their Poles” should be the basis 
for the “reorganized government.” “Otherwise,” as 
Molotov argued to the Commission, “it wouldn't 
be a reorganization of the Government, but its 
liquidation.”130
Neither the persistent objections raised by the 
Western diplomats, nor the protests of Roosevelt 
and Churchill in dispatches to Stalin had any 
effect; in reply Stalin accused Harriman and Kerr 
of deviating from the Yalta agreements and only 
agreed “to ask” the Provisional Government to 
consider Mikolajczyk's candidacy, provided that 
he declare his support for the Yalta resolutions. 
The only way “Poland might be saved from 
complete Soviet domination,” as Harriman 
summed up the situation in his telegram to the 
Secretary of State, April 7th, would be “to make 
arrangements for a few leaders of the Peasant and 
Socialist parties to take an active part in the
128 AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 39, d. 588, ll. 2, 1.
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Government.”131 The NKID had also received 
reports from sources in Polish circles, citing 
journalists that associated with the U.S. 
Ambassador, that there had been “a change in 
Harriman's position” which now favored 
acknowledging the possibility of “merely 
expanding the membership of the Warsaw 
government.”132 Further conflict developed 
around the list of people to be invited to Moscow 
for consultations. The “Warsaw list” had been 
drawn up by Bierut & Co. and was subsequently 
approved in Moscow, while the Anglo-American 
list was composed by Mikolajczyk's group in 
London, and had been then reshuffled by the State 
Department and the Foreign Office.133 The Soviets 
for all practical purposes did not conceal the 
authorship of their proposals, while the Allies tried 
to keep their sources secret. The two lists did not 
overlap (with the sole exception of Kutzeba), and 
therefore were mutually unacceptable.
The following shows how one and the same 
candidate figures in the internal evaluations of the 
Soviets and the Allies (the official British 
characterization is given in parentheses): Cardinal 
A. Sapieha—“a profoundly reactionary person of 
the NDK-fascist school, boundlessly devoted to 
the Vatican, an enemy of democracy. Absolutely 
unacceptable for the negotiations” (“a well-known 
and well-respected figure, whose authority is 
particularly great among that part of the population 
which is predominantly Catholic”); Z. Zaremba— 
“Members of the PPR characterize Zaremba as a 
sworn enemy of the USSR and the unity of the 
worker's movement. His support for concord and a 
coalition government is just talk. His candidacy. 
is absolutely unacceptable” (“he enjoys significant 
influence among the socialists. He proved his 
worth in the struggle against the German 
occupation”). Moscow did not have a better 
opinion of Mikolajczyk himself, whom 
Washington and London considered to be an 
essential participant in the new government and its 
No. 1 candidate: “.Mikolajczyk is clearly anti-
Soviet. His negotiations with the Polish National 
Committee in Moscow served as a screen for 
Polish reactionaries. Correspondence we have 
intercepted between Mikolajczyk and the leaders
131 A. Harriman to the Secretary of State, April 7, 
1945—WAHP, CF, Cont. 178.
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of the Home Army show him to be a vehement 
enemy of the USSR.”134
Another crisis in Allied relations in connection 
with the Berne incident broke out on the 
background of this tightening of the Polish knot. 
Harriman's role in this well-known but still 
controversial story about U.S. intelligence's secret 
contacts in Berne with Nazi representatives in 
regard to German's unconditional surrender in 
Italy proved to be an altogether important one. 
After receiving an inquiry from Molotov on March 
12th requesting the presence of Soviet 
representatives in these contacts, Harriman first 
recommended to Washington that it decline on the 
grounds that Berne was a question of preliminary 
contacts regarding purely military matters. “Under 
similar circumstances the Soviet Government,” the 
Ambassador added vindictively, “would not allow 
our officers to participate. He [Harriman] further 
considers that our agreement to the Russians going 
to Berne would be considered by the Soviets as a 
sign of weakness and would lead to more 
untenable demands from the Russians.” The 
Ambassador's argument formed the basis of the 
position of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,135 and 
later that of Roosevelt himself, who feared that a 
Soviet presence in Berne would dispel the 
Germans' desire to surrender; moreover, he 
considered Italy to lie in the sphere of Western 
influence in which the deciding word should be 
made by the Anglo-Americans.136
Harriman was the first to respond to Molotov's 
indignant protests delivered to him on March 16th, 
which called the American refusal “completely 
unexpected and incomprehensible from the point 
of view of the Allied relations between our 
countries” and he demanded a halt to the 
negotiations.137 “The arrogant language of 
Molotov's letter,” the Ambassador remarked, 
“brings out into the open a domineering attitude 
toward the United States which we have before 
only suspected.”138 Later that same day he sent a 
telegram outlining his thoughts on the possible 
motives for such a “strong” reaction on the part of 
the Soviets. The Ambassador wrote that it was
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137 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia, vol. 2, pp. 332-
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entirely possible that the Russians didn't believe 
the Americans or that “they may be fearful or have 
information that... there may be other groups of 
Germans who are considering surrendering to us 
with a view of protecting themselves.”139
The Ambassador was close to the truth. The 
Soviets had grounds for not trusting the Allies on 
this issue, as they had acquired a great deal of 
information on the proceedings in Berne and other 
secret Allied contacts with the Germans, including 
various intermediaries. Agents and informers of 
Soviet intelligence in London, Paris and the 
capitals of the neutral states were regularly 
reporting “peace feelers” on the part of the 
German secret service with the aim of attaining 
separate agreements with the Western Allies on 
the last stage of the war. Thus in early April, 
Merkulov, head of the NKGB, reported to 
Molotov that “according to information we have 
from Polish emigre circles in London, the German 
command has supposedly come to an 
understanding through Burchardt [the President of 
the International Red Cross—V.P.] with the 
English and Americans that all of the tank and 
mechanized units will be removed from the 
Western front and transferred to the Eastern front 
until the Allies occupy the remainder of 
Germany.”140 Naturally, this sort of information, 
given the Soviet's usual suspiciousness of their 
Western partners and the heightened state of 
tension occasioned by the final stages of an 
exhausting war, created a negative background in 
the Kremlin for dealing with the Berne incident. 
The Kremlin became convinced (as Molotov wrote 
in reply to assurances of the Anglo-Americans) 
that negotiations with the Germans were being 
carried on “behind the back of the Soviet Union 
which had borne the brunt of the war against 
Germany.”141
A few days later an exchange of 
communications at the highest levels led to mutual 
recriminations between Roosevelt and Stalin, the 
harshest exchanged by the two throughout the 
entire war period. However, certain new details 
that shed light on the sharpness of the Soviet 
reaction are not as well known. The examination 
of Stalin's archive shows that the key dispatch, 
dated April 3rd (perceived by Harriman and the 
White House to be the most offensive), from 
beginning to end was penned by Stalin himself, in 
stark contrast to the overwhelming majority of
139 Ibid.
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other dispatches to Roosevelt, composed on the 
basis of Molotov's preliminary drafts. Moreover, 
at the last moment Stalin introduced two additions 
into the typewritten text of the dispatch (they are 
indicated by italics), which raised the stakes of the 
“Berne incident” to the maximum:
It is clear that this situation cannot by any 
means serve the cause of maintaining and 
strengthening trust between our countries. I 
personally and my colleagues under no 
circumstances would have taken such a risky 
step, because we understand that a fleeting 
advantage, no matter what it is, pales before 
the advantage based on maintaining [Stalin's 
italics-VP] and strengthening trust among
Allies.142
The famous decision not to send Molotov to 
the opening of the founding conference of the 
United Nations in San Francisco, made during the 
height of the “Berne crisis,” it seems, was directly 
connected. The matter was not simply limited to 
the substitution of Gromyko for Molotov, as it is 
usually interpreted in works on the subject. In 
accordance with the Resolution of the Politburo on 
March 13th (i.e., before the beginning of the Berne 
incident) the Soviet delegation that was to travel to 
San Francisco was to be an unusually 
representative one, as evidenced by the 
participation of A. Zhdanov and other Party and 
government leaders, which apparently was meant 
to emphasize the USSR's special role in the 
founding of the United Nations, as well as the 
great importance the Kremlin attached to the 
launch of this international organization. Only a 
little more than a week later, however, this 
decision was revised by sharply lowering the level 
and reducing the numbers of the Soviet delegates. 
What was to have been a stately and imposing 
representation had become merely a working-level 
delegation.143 This could hardly have come as a 
result of Molotov's “very busy schedule” during 
the session of the Supreme Soviet, as the official 
version stated in explanation to the disappointed 
Allies.
Apart from the Polish question and the Berne 
incident, significant difficulties arose in 
connection with the realization of the Yalta 
agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war.
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no. 6 (1999).
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The Americans, accustomed to protecting their 
citizens, could not understand the apathetic and 
disdainful attitude of the Soviets to the Allied 
military personnel liberated from the Germans. 
The matter was complicated by the fact that the 
majority of the recent American prisoners found 
themselves on Polish territory and the Soviet 
command did not want to allow U.S. 
representatives access and denied these requests on 
various pretexts. American officers who by some 
miracle had made their way to Moscow told Deane 
and Harriman about their ordeals and the difficult 
conditions in the Soviet filtration camps. Harriman 
and Deane bombarded the NKID and the General 
Staff in vain with requests and offers of assistance. 
“I am outraged,” the Ambassador telegraphed to 
Roosevelt on March 14th, after receiving from 
Molotov the explanation that it was not Moscow, 
but the “Provisional Government of Poland that 
objects to the admittance of American 
representatives.” “In my opinion, the Soviet 
government is trying to use our prisoners of war as 
a truncheon to increase the prestige of the Polish 
government by forcing us to appeal to it.” After 
receiving Harriman's report, Roosevelt adopted a 
more intense tone in his discussion of this problem 
in his correspondence with Stalin.144
Other smaller sources of irritation also began to 
amass: the unwillingness of the Soviets to admit 
U.S. representatives into the liberated territories of 
other countries in Eastern Europe, the delay in 
settling the issue of granting the Americans 
airbases in the Primorye, a secret delivery of Lend- 
Lease supplies to the Provisional Government in 
Poland and the USSR's other newly acquired 
allies. The tone of the recommendations of the 
U.S. Embassy and military mission in Moscow 
became harsher and harsher—right up to proposals 
to curtail Lend-Lease deliveries.145 *
Harriman carefully tried to convey to his 
Soviet colleagues this sense of growing irritation 
with Moscow's conduct, putting the blame on the 
U.S. domestic situation. Thus at a tea given in 
honor of Clementine Churchill by Molotov's wife, 
P. S. Zhemchuzhina, the Ambassador among other 
things confided to I. M. Maisky about “certain 
misgivings”: “The President is very distressed and 
disappointed. The press and U.S. public opinion 
clearly evidence a growing irritation and 
discontent with the course of events after the 
Crimean conference. Given this situation a 
relatively minor incident would suffice for a storm
144 Perepiska, vol. 1, pp. 193-95.




to break out in America.” (A transcript of this 
conversation with Harriman's “friendly warning” 
was duly distributed to Molotov and all of his 
deputies.)146 In early April, Harriman, sensing a 
lack of support from Washington, decided to 
devise a conceptual base for his harsh line and 
once again returned to the idea of using economic 
assistance for political ends. In his long analytical 
dispatch to the Secretary of State on April 4th, he 
unambiguously characterizes the Soviet strategy in 
Kennan's terms as one directed at the 
Bolshevization of all of Europe: “We must clearly 
recognize that the Soviet program is the 
establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal 
liberty and democracy as we know and respect it.” 
“The Soviet government,” Harriman continued, 
“will end this war with the largest gold reserve of 
any country except the United States, will have 
large quantities of Lend-Lease material and 
equipment not used or worn out in the war with 
which to assist their reconstruction, will ruthlessly 
strip the enemy countries they have occupied of 
everything they can move, will control the foreign 
trade of countries under their domination... and at 
the same time they will demand from us every 
form of aid and assistance which they think they 
can get from us while using our assistance to 
promote their political aims to our disadvantage in 
other parts of the world.” There was only one 
conclusion to be made: since the United States 
could not have a tug-of-war with the Soviet Union 
over the political methods of disseminating its 
system, the primary weapon would be financial 
and economic leverage. “Unless we are ready to 
live in a world dominated by Soviet influence, we 
must use our economic power to assist those 
countries that are naturally friendly to our 
concepts.” In particular, Harriman proposed 
“taking care of our western Allies and other areas 
under our responsibility first,” so as to deprive the 
USSR of the economic conditions favorable to 
spreading its influence.147
Harriman's recommendations were taken so 
seriously that they garnered the first page in the 
State Department's daily summary of the most 
important reports.148 The White House, however, 
did not pay attention to Harriman's 
recommendations; nor did Roosevelt heed the
Ambassador's urgent request to be recalled to 
Washington for a personal briefing. Following the 
President's orders, the U.S. Combined Chiefs of 
Staff at the same time declined proposals by Deane 
and Harriman regarding measures to limit military 
cooperation with the USSR in response to the 
“disloyal conduct” of the Soviet leaders.149 In the 
end, Roosevelt decided to smooth over the Berne 
incident and sent Stalin a conciliatory message 
with assurances that “minor misunderstandings of 
this character should not arise in the future.”150 
After receiving this dispatch for delivery to the 
Kremlin, Harriman on his own initiative delayed 
delivering it on the pretext of waiting for 
additional information from Kerr (on coordinating 
the Anglo-American reaction regarding Berne), 
but mainly in order to try to toughen the tone of 
the dispatch. “May I respectfully suggest,” he 
telegraphed to Roosevelt on April 12th, “that the 
word ‘minor' as a qualification of 
‘misunderstanding' be eliminated.” The 
Ambassador had even prepared a new text for the 
dispatch, which omitted the unpleasant epithet, but 
the President apparently considered that this 
nuance was very important. “I do not intend,” he 
answered Harriman that same day, “to omit the 
word ‘minor' as it is my desire to consider the 
Berne misunderstanding a minor incident.”151
This was one of the President's last orders, 
made just a few hours before his death. The 
Embassy learned of the President's death on the 
night of April 13th. “At 2:50 a.m. Harriman 
telephoned and requested that People's Commissar 
Molotov be informed that not long before 23:00 
hours Moscow time U.S. President Roosevelt 
passed away,” the Commissar's duty officer, M. 
Potrubach, recorded in his journal. “Harriman 
stated that he would like to see Stalin and Molotov 
today as early as possible.” The Ambassador 
clearly was restless—five minutes later he called 
the NKID again and asked for a meeting with the 
Commissar “tonight.” At 3:05 Potrubach called 
Harriman back to convey Molotov's wish “to visit 
the Ambassador immediately, if that was 
convenient” (this unusual night-time desire 
evidently arose after Molotov spoke with the 
“Master”).152 Molotov, Harriman reported to 
Washington the following day, “seemed very upset
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and agitated. I had never seen him so sincere.” 
On the evening of the same day Harriman was 
received by Stalin, who was also apparently 
shocked by the sudden news. Harriman reported 
that “[Stalin] greeted me in silence and stood 
holding my hand for about 30 seconds before 
asking me to sit down.” After answering Stalin's 
questions about the circumstances of the 
President's death and about his successor, 
Harriman assured the Soviet leader that Truman 
would continue Roosevelt's policies. “President 
Roosevelt has died but his cause must live on,” 
Stalin replied. “We shall support President Truman 
with all our forces and all our will.”153 In the 
Soviet transcript of this conversation Stalin's 
reaction appears more muted, but it contains words 
spoken by Harriman, missing entirely from the 
American version, to the effect that Truman “of 
course, will seek the advice of people who were 
Roosevelt's closest advisers,” and that “the people 
who were closest to Roosevelt would stay on as 
Truman's advisers.”154
These sentiments, by no means elicited by the 
Soviets, it would seem were called forth to 
reassure not Stalin as much as Harriman himself, 
whose powerful protector in the Oval Office was 
succeeded by a man he did not know. Another 
comrade-in-arms of the late President understood 
the situation all too well, namely, Hopkins, who 
telegraphed Harriman that same day: “I know what 
a great shock the President's death must have 
been. Over the years the President, as you well 
know, had become devoted to you and had the 
utmost confidence in your judgment. Many times 
after I left you at Yalta he spoke of what a great 
help you were to him.”155 As Kerr ironically noted 
in his political report to London, “On the death of 
President Roosevelt a gust of anxiety about his 
own position passed over Mr. Harriman. He had 
been in very close personal touch with the White 
House. and he seemed to see the bottom falling 
out of things. He asked himself and me how he 
was likely to stand with the new President.”156
Therefore, when Stalin began to speak about 
support for President Truman on the part of the 
Soviets, Harriman seized the moment to make a 
move he had prepared earlier—to raise once again 
the issue of Molotov going to San Francisco and 
Washington “as confirmation of what Marshal
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Stalin has said regarding the American people and 
Truman.” The Ambassador even invited Molotov 
to travel on an American airplane over the shorter 
route across Europe, and jokingly offered to have a 
red star painted on the plane. Stalin quipped that a 
green star would be better, and then seriously 
showed interest in the question of the invitation— 
was this an official invitation or did this invitation 
come from Harriman himself? Harriman admitted 
that he had been improvising, but he assured Stalin 
that he was certain that an official invitation would 
be forthcoming. The temptation to make a gesture 
of goodwill in regard to Roosevelt and Truman, 
and at the same time to “sound out” the new 
President was too great. Stalin, after conferring 
with Molotov, promised Harriman that the 
Commissar would make the trip.157 The 
Ambassador had a double cause for celebration. In 
addition to the diplomatic success, the question 
had been decided regarding his traveling to 
Washington to report to the new President, which 
he had requested again after Roosevelt's death. 
The following day the State Department readily 
confirmed that Molotov's visit “would be 
welcomed as an indication of earnest cooperation 
with President Truman.”158 Molotov, it is true, 
flew on an American airplane, but not over 
Europe; instead he traveled the long-tested route 
across Siberia and Alaska. Harriman, however, 
departed in the opposite direction, thereby gaining 
two extra days that were put to good use.
These two days were filled with important 
meetings in the State Department and the White 
House. On April 20th, the first meeting between 
Harriman and Truman took place, with Stettinius 
and Grew present, during the course of which the 
Ambassador laid out the full complement of his 
main arguments with which he had unsuccessfully 
bombarded Roosevelt, adding for good measure 
the threat of a “barbarian invasion of Europe.”159 
Truman, however, reacted completely differently 
than Roosevelt—both in essence and in his direct 
approach: “The President said that he was not in 
any sense afraid of the Russians and that he 
intended to be firm but fair since in his opinion the 
Soviet Union needed us more than we needed 
them.” To Harriman's cautious reminder about the 
inevitability of compromise, Truman replied, “We 
could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of 
what we wanted but that on important matters he
157 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia, vol. 2, p. 358.
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felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.” 
When he was left alone with the President, 
Harriman hastened (as Truman writes in his 
memoirs) to express that he was relieved that 
Truman had read all the recent cables and that “we 
see eye to eye on the situation.”160 Truman praised 
the Ambassador for his good work and asked him 
to continue sending “long messages.”
Inspired by his successful debut, Harriman 
continued his campaign at two meetings with the 
State Department administration on April 20-21, at 
which the discussion more concretely addressed 
sore points in American-Soviet relations. They 
discussed the possibility of using various 
incentives to exert pressure on the USSR, the main 
one being the credit for postwar reconstruction. 
Calling for a rebuff to the “Soviet threat,” 
Harriman at the same time counseled, “it was 
important not to overestimate Soviet strength. The 
Army is an extraordinarily effective but 
disorganized mass of human beings. Almost all of 
the Army's transport equipment and much of its 
food is supplied by us. The country is still 
fantastically backward. There is no road system, 
railroad mileage is very inadequate, and ninety 
percent of the people of Moscow live in a 
condition comparable with our worst slum 
areas.”161 It was precisely this backwardness, 
Harriman reported, which was responsible for the 
intense interest on the part of Moscow for U.S. 
economic cooperation and which would better the 
chances of the Kremlin yielding on political issues. 
The administration reacted very favorably and 
these ideas were soon put into action.
The position of the U.S. military command 
also quickly changed after Roosevelt's death. The 
Combined Chiefs of Staff already on April 17-23 
were reviewing its decisions made only two weeks 
earlier, and agreed with Deane and Harriman that 
joint projects with the Soviets should be 
terminated.162
Truman's first meeting with Molotov on April 
22nd was a preliminary “get-acquainted” affair and 
went rather smoothly. However, the subsequent 
meeting of the Big Three's foreign ministers 
served to confirm that an impasse on the Polish 
question had been reached. Molotov had strict 
instructions from Stalin to evade Allied attempts 
“to resolve the Polish question with you in
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America,” allegedly because of the absence of 
representatives from the Polish Provisional 
Government.163 Meanwhile, by this time the Soviet 
government had taken yet another step toward the 
legitimization of its Polish allies, by announcing 
their intention (“to accommodate the demands of 
the Soviet and Polish people”) to conclude with 
them a treaty on friendship and alliance. 
Vyshinsky had informed Harriman of this on April 
16th, clearly relishing the effect produced by the 
suddenness: “At first Harriman clearly had lost his 
bearings and he apparently did not know how he 
should react,” Vyshinsky recorded in his journal. 
After recovering, the Ambassador spoke of the 
necessity to wait for the formation of the new 
Polish government and for Washington to have 
time to issue a statement on this matter officially. 
In reply Vyshinsky magnanimously agreed to hear 
the American side, but “made it understood that 
the conclusion of the treaty could in no way be 
dependent upon remarks from the American 
government, if such remarks should be 
forthcoming.”164
Not surprisingly given the circumstances, the 
“Polish commission” in Washington had not made 
any progress. Before his next meeting with 
Molotov, Truman called a meeting to discuss 
Soviet policy with the Secretary of State, the 
military command, and Harriman. After listening 
to Stettinius's gloomy report on the results of the 
meeting of the three ministers, Truman set the tone 
for the discussion: “he felt that our agreements 
with the Soviet Union so far had been a one way 
street and that could not continue... He intended to 
go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the 
Russians did not wish to join us they could go to 
hell,” although at his previous meeting with 
Harriman, Truman had acknowledged that 
“without Russia there would not be much of a 
world organization.”165
However, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and 
General Marshall expressed themselves much 
more carefully. Stimson reminded them that the 
USSR had faithfully fulfilled their obligations in 
“big military matters” and he called for an 
understanding of Soviet motives in the Polish 
question. According to Stimson, “the Russians 
perhaps were being more realistic than we were in 
regard to their own security.” Marshall confirmed 
the military's great interest in the USSR's entry 
into the war with Japan, and agreed with Stimson
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that the Polish question made “the possibility of a 
break with Russia. very serious.” Harriman, 
Forrestal and Deane supported the President: in the 
Ambassador's opinion, firmness would only help 
to avoid a larger break, especially as the USSR, 
Deane added, will enter the war with Japan 
regardless of other factors. In short, Forrestal 
concluded “that if the Russians were to be rigid in 
their attitude we had better have a show down with 
them now than later.”166
And this was precisely what Truman did that 
same day at his meeting with Molotov. The several 
versions of this memorable meeting differ 
significantly,167 with Truman's account being the 
most dramatic (“I just gave him a straight one-two 
to the jaw”)—an exaggeration that becomes 
obvious when one compares the official transcripts 
of both sides. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that 
“the true successor to Roosevelt's legacy” 
subjected Molotov to a cold shower, above all on 
the Polish question. Afterwards Harriman would 
recall that he was surprised by “Truman's attack” 
and regretted this “mistake,” since “[Truman's] 
behavior gave Molotov an excuse to tell Stalin that 
the Roosevelt policy was being abandoned.”168 
The People's Commissar undoubtedly was cursing 
under his breath both the difficult journey and the 
man who had organized it, whose solemnly silent 
face seemed to confirm the seriousness of 
Truman's reprimand.
Further events merely confirmed that the 
political weather in Washington had changed. The 
United Nations founding conference in San 
Francisco began with bitter disputes on procedural 
questions, while in the lobby of the Fremont Hotel, 
where the conference was held, rumors circulated 
about an impending conflict and even war between 
the Allies. One of the main sources of these 
rumors was the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. 
Although formally Harriman was merely an 
adviser to the American delegation, he took upon 
himself the role of one of its major representatives. 
At a series of briefings for American journalists 
and publishers he decided to open the public's eye 
to the treachery of Soviet policies, and without 
mincing words he set forth his vision of an 
“irreconcilable conflict” breaking out between the 
Allies and the necessity for a new tough approach 
to the USSR. Many journalists were outraged by 
the unusually hostile tone—all the more so from a
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man who had a reputation for being a close 
supporter of Roosevelt. The well-known radio 
commentator Raymond Swing even left the room 
as a sign of protest, while the dean of American 
journalism, Walter Lippmann, in a fit of temper 
told Kerr that “Harriman should be recalled from 
Moscow.”169 Both journalists later shared their 
misgivings with acquaintances in the State 
Department. Rumors about the bellicose 
declarations of “official persons” (including 
Harriman himself) were picked up by the press and 
elicited a flood of indignant letters to the State 
Department. But no reprisals were forthcoming. 
And where would they have come from if even 
Joseph Grew—the State Department's number 2 
man—believed that war with the USSR in the near 
future was inevitable and Harriman and Bohlen 
had to dissuade him from circulating a 
memorandum on this score.170
Harriman's chief concern, however, was not 
public opinion, but the government's. With his 
very active participation in early May two 
initiatives were prepared. On May 9th, the day 
following the signing of the Act on Germany's 
Unconditional Surrender, at a meeting with 
Stettinius in San Francisco, Harriman's long-
standing proposal was accepted to sharply reduce 
Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR, redirecting 
them for economic assistance in Western 
Europe.171 Stettinius sent the corresponding orders 
to Washington; Harriman left for the capital that 
same day. On May 10th he was present at a key 
interdepartmental meeting on the fate of Soviet 
Lend-Lease. The next day Grew and Leo Crowley 
(the Foreign Economic administrator) presented to 
Truman a draft of a directive that stated that 
planned deliveries to the Soviet Union “should be 
cut off immediately.”172 Truman signed the 
directive right away, and early on the morning of 
May 12th Crowley's representatives on the 
Committee for Soviet Protocol were insisting on 
the literal interpretation of “cut off 
immediately”—not only was the loading of ships 
in port brought to a halt, but ships on the 
Mediterranean and Black seas bound for the USSR 
were turned back.173 This last action was clearly
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uncalled for and was interpreted as an intentional 
provocation, especially as all this was done 
without informing the Soviets, who were simply 
notified of an “immediate adjustment” in the 
delivery of supplies.
The Soviet representatives in New York 
immediately informed the embassy about what 
was happening in the harbor and the charge 
d'affaires, M. Novikov, urgently demanded an 
explanation from Grew, who denied the existence 
of such orders and directed Novikov to another of 
Stettinius's deputies—William Clayton. The State 
Department immediately opened an investigation 
into the matter, in which Harriman was actively 
involved. He was the first to sound the alarm by 
telephoning all the key players (Crowley, Clayton, 
Generals York and Wesson), after which it was 
decided to once again turn the ships around and 
have them resume the deliveries as originally 
planned.174 That evening Clayton informed 
Novikov of the reversal, explaining that what had 
happened was due to a misunderstanding. The 
members of the Soviet Protocol Committee 
complained privately about the authors of the 
unfortunate phrasing that had tripped the President 
up, and hoped that “no real damage was done.”175
The damage, however, proved to be 
considerable. Even the experienced Soviet 
diplomats in Washington, who had a sense of the 
bureaucratic muddle brought about by this 
decision, were struck by the “repressive measure,” 
as Novikov reported to Moscow.176 In Moscow it 
was interpreted both as an attempt to apply 
political pressure on the USSR and as a break from 
the depoliticization of Lend-Lease under 
Roosevelt. Restrained indignation informed even 
the official diplomatic note of response, which 
dryly stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
abide by the decisions of the U.S. government if it 
“did not see any other solution.” Molotov's stern 
instructions to the Soviet ambassador sent with 
that same diplomatic note plainly and forcefully 
expressed the feeling in Moscow: “Do not barge in 
with pitiful requests. If the U.S. want to cut off the 
deliveries, it will be all the worse for them.”177
Thus once again rudeness, as in the case with 
Truman's “right on the jaw,” backfired. On the one 
hand, Moscow's irritation and uncompromising
attitude were intensified, while on the other hand, 
Washington was forced to back down. The tone of 
this had been at odds with Harriman's 
recommendation for a tough stand and a “friendly” 
tone when dealing with the Russians. Sensing the 
tough line the Kremlin would adopt, Harriman 
persuaded Truman, not without some difficulty, to 
approve Bohlen's plan of sending Hopkins to 
Moscow to clear away all the stumbling blocks in 
the relations between the two countries, since 
Hopkins still enjoyed the Kremlin's enormous 
respect.
At the same time, the Ambassador, with 
Grew's support, undertook a revision of the Yalta 
accords on the Far East. The end of the war in 
Europe had bolstered the belief that the USSR one 
way or another would enter the war with Japan and 
at the same time it was believed that Soviet 
participation had become less essential, all of 
which tempted Harriman and several other 
American diplomats to lower the price that had 
been promised but not yet paid to the Soviet Union 
for its participation. Specifically, the discussion 
centered on cutting back on the rights assigned the 
Soviets in Port Arthur and Dairen, getting 
additional concessions on Manchuria and Korea, 
as well as allowing the U.S. Air Force access to 
the Kurile Islands. Grew dispatched an inquiry on 
these points to the Secretary of War on May 
12th.178 Stimson, however, was not favorably 
disposed to the plan. He emphasized that the U.S. 
military attached great significance to the USSR's 
entry into the war with Japan; moreover, he 
believed it was impossible to prevent the Red 
Army from occupying the territories under 
question (with the exception of the Kuriles, where 
U.S. interference would prolong the war with 
Japan and result in larger losses).179 Retrenching 
on Yalta did not succeed this time, though 
attempts such as these would continue in the 
future.
But in general Harriman left Washington 
satisfied: he had made a significant contribution to 
the new policy toward Moscow and he had 
managed to confirm his special position as a close 
adviser to the new president and his main go- 
between in relations with Stalin. The 
Ambassador's personal relations with Truman had 
also shaped up nicely, reinforced by generous gifts
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from Moscow, as he had done with Roosevelt.180 
As Kerr noted in his report, “Mr. Harriman 
returned from San Francisco apparently reassured 
and feeling that he had the confidence of the State 
Department and the White House.”181
Pressing matters awaited him in Moscow: 
negotiations to settle disputes on Lend-Lease and 
credits, the Polish question, and preparations for 
the next meeting of the Big Three. In Washington, 
Harriman had tried to convince Truman to move 
this meeting earlier, before the withdrawal of the 
principal U.S. military forces from the continent, 
but the President had his own reasons—he was 
waiting for the results of the first nuclear weapons 
test and he wanted to get used to his new position, 
afraid that he might play a losing hand with the 
Big Two—Churchill and Stalin. As far as 
economic assistance was concerned, the 
administration's new stance on this issue was 
clearly conveyed in the State Department's daily 
summary of events for the President, which 
reported on Harriman's meetings with Mikoyan— 
“to give as little as possible and to use these 
deliveries to further our own aims and not those of 
the Russians.”182 Washington requested that all 
future accountings on Lend-Lease be put on a 
commercial basis (with the exception of deliveries 
to the Far East) and dragged its feet on deciding 
what to do about credits. Harriman had also cooled 
to this idea of his. In part influenced by Kennan, 
he now believed that the Kremlin would use this 
credit for purposes that were hostile to U.S. 
interests and that the Russians would almost 
certainly not make big political concessions in 
order to receive these credits. Mikoyan was 
already reproaching Harriman for re-routing 
supplies intended for the USSR to countries in 
Western Europe, even before the Soviets received 
preliminary notification about this.183
The issue of putting Lend-Lease deliveries on a 
commercial basis was gradually settled, which 
cannot be said about the Polish question. Further
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presents (H. Truman to A. Harriman, May 14, 1945, 
ibid.).
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Documents on Foreign Affairs,part 3, series A, vol. 6, p. 
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(henceforth HSTL), President's Secretary File, Subject 
File.
183 A. Harriman to the Secretary of State, May 30, 1945, 
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meetings of the tripartite commission had not 
settled anything and the Ambassador was placing 
all his hopes on Hopkins' talks with Stalin, which 
began on May 26th with Molotov and Harriman 
taking part.
Hopkins (whom Churchill not for nothing had 
nicknamed “Root of the Matter”) immediately won 
over Stalin by finally calling a spade a spade—in 
the spirit of Yalta, the U.S. would acknowledge 
that “the members of the present Warsaw regime 
would constitute a majority of the new Polish 
Provisional Government.”184 Hopkins also let it be 
understood that the U.S. might agree to the quotas 
proposed by Moscow (three from London and five 
from Poland) if the Soviets were to make 
concessions on the persons to be invited for 
consultation. After this was settled the bargaining 
was reduced to drawing up the list of persons to be 
invited, which would be submitted for approval by 
the end of the negotiations. Stalin had to resign 
himself with the inclusion of not only 
Mikolajczyk, but also Witos and Stanczyk. 
Moscow considered the first one to be an 
unacceptable candidate on account of his “kulak 
origins” and “popularity among the well-to-do 
peasantry.”185 The second candidate (the leader of 
the Socialist Party), Stalin had characterized in a 
telegram as a “figure who could not gain our 
sympathy.”186 In view of these concessions, 
Hopkins and Harriman recommended that the 
White House give its consent to the present list. 
Consent quickly followed from both Washington 
and London. Nevertheless, the overall balance 
favored the pro-Soviet contingent. Modzelewski, 
the Ambassador of the Provisional Government in 
Poland, upon learning of the agreement struck on 
June 6th, in a meeting at the NKID called it a 
“victory on all fronts” and a “great and undoubted 
success for Soviet diplomacy.”187
The composition of the new Polish government 
was finally agreed upon during consultations, 
conducted under the aegis of the tripartite 
commission, of the Polish representatives who had 
been invited to Moscow. The “non-Lublin Poles” 
won only six places out of twenty-one and all the
184 Memorandum of Hopkins-Stalin conversation, May
30, 1945, ibid., p. 305.
185 Kratkie spravki o poliakakh, vyzyvaemykh v 
kachestve lits dlia konsul'tatsii o budushchem 
Vremennom Pol'skom pravitel'stve, April 2, 1945, AVP 
RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 39, d. 588, ll.27-28.
186 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 770, l. 1.
187 Transcript of conversation with Modzelewski, 
Ambassador of the Polish Republic, June 7, 1945 (from 
the journal of A. N. Abramov), AVP RF, f. 7, op. 10, p. 
21, d. 304, l. 57.
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key power departments remained in the hands of 
Bierut's party. While recommending that the 
White House recognize the new government, 
Harriman did not conceal the contrast between the 
“high spirits” of Molotov and the Warsaw Poles 
and “the other Poles [who] were seriously 
concerned.”188 During the negotiations he had 
become well acquainted with all of the Polish 
candidates and could discern the true mood on 
both sides. Harriman, like the pro-Western Poles, 
saw the only hope for averting the complete 
Sovietization of Poland to be the promised “free 
elections” and winning over Poland to the side of 
the U.S. by economic means. (The Ambassador's 
recommendation on economic assistance to 
Warsaw laid the foundation for the U.S. initial 
approach to the new regime.189) But misgivings for 
the future alternated with a feeling of relief—the 
excruciating Polish marathon was behind him, and 
the Secretary of State was “deeply grateful” for the 
work he had done.190 Much later, it is true, some 
American historians in their search for guilty 
parties accused Harriman of pandering to Stalin 
and his policies on Poland and practically name 
him as the author of the Yalta conception for the 
“reorganization” of the Lublin government—an 
accusation, which, to put it mildly, is not fully 
deserved.191
Hopkins' visit, which had resolved certain 
other vexed issues as well (above all, the 
procedural question of voting in the Security 
Council), for a time improved the atmosphere in 
Moscow. “Attitude of Soviet officers less 
constrained since Mr. Hopkins departed,” the 
Ambassador reported in his telegram to Truman. 
“Stalin presented Harriman with two trained 
cavalry horses.”192 (The Ambassador, a passionate 
horseman, had noticed them at a military parade 
and Stalin there and then made a present of them 
for the personal use of Harriman and Kathleen.)
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The Polish knot had scarcely been untied 
before Harriman had to settle down to some other 
serious negotiations. On June 30th Chinese Foreign 
Minister, T. V. Soong, arrived in Moscow to 
conclude a treaty based on the Yalta accords. The 
State Department and Harriman followed the 
course of these negotiations very carefully and 
attempted to use the Chinese to make adjustments 
to the Yalta agreements, particularly maintaining 
the “open doors” in Manchuria. The Ambassador 
met daily with Soong, who not only kept him 
apprised of developments in the talks, but also 
coordinated his efforts with him.193 By mid-July 
the only issues yet to be resolved concerned the 
ports and railroads. Stalin, citing Yalta and the 
lawful restitution of Russian claims in Manchuria, 
demanded principal interest in the management of 
the railroads, as well as including Dairen in the 
zone of Soviet military control. Soong, supported 
by the Americans, insisted on the 
internationalization of Dairen and an equal share 
in the management of the railroads.194 Negotiations 
were suspended at this point; Stalin departed for 
Berlin and Soong left for Peking to consult with 
Chiang Kai-shek. In his report to the President and 
Secretary of State on the impasse that had been 
reached, Harriman wrote that Soong “is hopeful 
that you will be able to get Stalin to accept the 
Chinese position at the forthcoming conference or 
that you will be able to work out a compromise 
which the Generalissimo can accept.”195 At the 
same time he asked the State Department to 
prepare for Potsdam a detailed interpretation of the 
Yalta agreements related to the Far East so that 
they could “press” Stalin fully armed on these 
issues at the conference.196
Not a single copy of the secret Yalta protocols 
could be found in the State Department (it was 
later discovered in Roosevelt's safe), but this did 
not hinder its experts from composing a thorough 
report (“on the basis of our recollections of its 
contents”), the primary conclusion of which was
193 See, for example, Conversation between A. 
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Cont. 179.
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reduced to the following: the restitution of Russian 
rights in Manchuria, provided for by the protocol, 
“if carried out in full would represent a reversion 
to a situation which was one of the most 
pernicious foci of imperialism.”197 Therefore, it 
was suggested that a “modification in favor of 
China (and other countries)” be sought on the 
points regarding Dairen and the railroads, that the 
“internationalization of Dairen” be interpreted in 
the spirit of the “open door” policy, while “joint 
operation” of the railroads “did not call for transfer 
of exclusive ownership to the Soviet Union and for 
vesting Russia with a predominant position in 
management.”
Harriman's recommendations to Truman and 
Byrnes during the course of the conference 
maintained this same line. What's more, with his 
skills as a businessman and lawyer, he suggested 
to tie the USSR's “pre-eminent interests” in 
Manchuria to the right of free transit across this 
territory.198 The Americans were getting ready for 
a tough bargaining session.
However, to their amazement and immense 
pleasure, Stalin at the first meeting with Truman 
on July 17th expressed his willingness to liberalize 
the Yalta accords: to relinquish military control 
over Dairen, declaring it a “free port,” as well as 
accelerating the subsequent transfer of the 
railroads to China.199 Truman happily confided to 
Stimson that same day that he had “clinched the 
Open Door in Manchuria.”200 Now all that 
remained was to promote and consolidate that 
success at the next stage of Soviet-Chinese talks.
In other respects, Harriman played an 
altogether modest role at the conference. The new 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, regarded the 
venerable diplomats with jealousy and kept them 
out of the important negotiations. Harriman's 
participation was limited to attending meetings of 
the three ministers of foreign affairs and he also 
met regularly with the members of the Polish 
delegation that had come to Potsdam. The sight of 
the ravaged Soviet zone in Germany made a 
baleful impression and only served to intensify his 
belief that “Soviet expansion” must be blocked. 
The Ambassador's frame of mind at the
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conference was captured by Joseph Davies who 
had come to Potsdam as Truman's personal 
adviser. Doubly irritated by his appearance 
(competition, and from someone who was 
fervently pro-Soviet at that), Harriman spoke out 
sharply on the need “to protect the position of the 
President from these barbarians.” Davies, who 
knew nothing of the evolution in Harriman's 
thinking over the last six months was shocked by 
the Ambassador's “anti-Soviet views” and warned 
him frankly that “if the Russian intelligence knew 
of his attitude, as undoubtedly it now did, it was 
not probable that his service as Ambassador to the 
Soviets would be productive of much service in 
preserving confidence.” The Ambassador tried to 
reason with Davies, but later he again turned the 
conversation to the “one way street.” “My 
rejoinder,” Davies recorded in his diary, “was that 
whether we liked it or not, we were both on the 
same street, and unless we could get along, there 
would be no order and law on that street, but riot 
and bloodshed, which would destroy not only the 
street, but the whole community. I urged upon him 
that he was one of the big men whom history 
would ultimately hold responsible for either 
destroying or preserving that unity and confidence 
upon which Peace depended.”201 The conversation 
ended on a conciliatory note, but each continued to 
hold his own opinion on the matter.
The Far East Gambit
Upon returning to Moscow from Potsdam, 
Harriman threw himself into the diplomatic 
skirmishes related to issues on the Far East. The 
Sino-Soviet talks resumed on August 7, 1945, with 
Harriman again playing the role of observer and 
silent partner. Even before his first meeting with 
Stalin, Soong came to an agreement with Harriman 
on China's initial position and the parameters of 
possible concessions to the Soviets. The first day 
of negotiations brought no progress on the most 
contentious issues, namely, Dairen and the 
railroads. Armed with instructions from 
Washington, drawn up on the basis of his own 
recommendations in Potsdam, Harriman met with 
Stalin face-to-face on August 8th. The Ambassador 
laid out the U.S. position on the issue and without 
beating about the bush proposed that the plan he 
had conceived in Potsdam be used as a joint Sino- 
Soviet statement to the U.S. Government on the




results of the negotiations.202 The Generalissimus 
chose to ignore the impudence of Harriman's 
interference, but he would not agree to a key point 
in the proposed document that reduced the USSR's 
“pre-eminent interests” in Manchuria to the right 
to unrestrained transit for all countries without 
discrimination or preference.
We are also opposed to discrimination, Stalin 
answered firmly, “but as regards preference, the 
Soviet government takes the position that the 
Soviet Union's pre-eminent interests entail certain 
preferences and that they should be guaranteed to 
the Soviet Union.”203 A tough and exhaustive 
argument ensued, during which Stalin, with map in 
hand, tried to prove the reasonableness of the 
Soviet demands in comparison with the rights of 
tsarist Russia, as well as the necessity for Soviet 
control of the port in Dairen, in order to maintain 
security against Japanese provocations: “A port 
should have one master.” Harriman made clear the 
White House's intent to support China on this 
matter. Stalin, for his part, “asked that Truman be 
informed of his request that Truman not make any 
decision, having heard only one side—the 
Chinese—without hearing out the Soviet 
government on this.”204 Stalin, however, assured 
the Ambassador that Dairen would be open for 
international trade. But Harriman no longer took 
the Kremlin's master at his word: “In spite of 
Stalin's assurances it is difficult for me to believe 
that there can be a truly free port under Soviet 
management,” he reported to Washington.205
Stalin's uncompromising stance prompted the 
Ambassador to consider another risky idea. In 
Potsdam he had learned of the U.S. military's 
proposal to occupy Dairen and Korea in the event 
that Japan surrendered before Soviet troops had 
entered these territories. Now, “in light of the way 
Stalin is behaving increasing his demands on 
Soong,” he advised Truman to immediately 
implement this recommendation,206 evidently 
hoping to rule out or at least hamper the port's 
likely transfer to the Soviets. We do not know 
what role this dispatch played in the White 
House's decision, but on the following day, 
August 11th, Truman ordered that Dairen be 
occupied after Japan's surrender “if by then it is
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not taken by the forces of the Soviet 
government.”207
Truman's directive, issued before Dairen's fate 
was decided in the course of the Sino-Soviet 
negotiations and which essentially made provision 
for its seizure, regardless of the outcome of the 
talks, could have had extremely severe 
repercussions. Fortunately, the American landing 
forces were delayed, and the Soviets outstripped 
them in this undeclared “race for Dairen.”208
Harriman not only coordinated the joint U.S.- 
Chinese opposition to the Kremlin, but he also 
prevailed upon Soong not to give in to Stalin's 
renowned pressure tactics. The Ambassador even 
insisted that his warning that “further concessions” 
would lie on the conscience of the Chinese 
government be entered into the protocol of his 
meetings with the Chinese minister.209
Both sides were forced to make “further 
concessions” in the treaty on friendship and 
alliance that was signed on August 14th—the 
USSR was granted only a minor advantage in the 
management of the railroads, the Soviet chief of 
the Port of Dairen would be confirmed by both 
parties, and instead of joint ownership of the port 
the USSR was merely granted the right to lease 
half its facilities and equipment.210 (Stalin also 
gave verbal assurances regarding the observation 
of an “open door” policy in Manchuria, but evaded 
written obligations on that point.) The compromise 
was reached, in large part, thanks to U.S. 
intervention and Harriman's personal 
perseverance. A curious acknowledgment of 
Harriman's role as the “fifth wheel” can be found 
in Molotov's exasperated notes on his drafts of the 
outcome of the Sino-Soviet negotiations: opposite 
the point on Dairen stands the remark “U.S. 
interference,” and at the end he notes “Harriman's 
constant contact with Soong” and “attempts on the 
part of the American government through
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Harriman to interfere in the course of the 
negotiations.”211
Rapid developments in military and diplomatic 
events regarding Japan were in the offing as the 
Sino-Soviet negotiations were finalized. After the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. 
dependence on Soviet assistance was lessened 
even further, and the primary goal of American 
diplomacy became limiting the undesirable 
consequences of the USSR's participation in the 
war with Japan, above all, minimizing the role of 
the Soviet Union in the occupation and postwar 
reconstruction.
The USSR's first announcement of its 
intentions came during the night of August 10th, 
when Harriman delivered to Molotov the U.S. 
draft of the response to the Japanese government's 
declaration of its intention to surrender. 
Consultation with Moscow (as was the case with 
the other Allies) on this issue was purely pro 
forma, since the White House had already firmly 
decided to act on its own here—at a meeting of his 
cabinet on August 10th, Truman had declared that 
he was prepared to manage without the 
Russians.212 Even though it was already past 
midnight, the Ambassador requested an urgent 
response, and two hours later he was invited once 
again to the Kremlin, along with Kerr. The Soviet 
government, Molotov submitted, was prepared to 
join the American declaration, provided that it 
state that the Allied Powers are prepared “to reach 
an agreement on the candidacy or candidacies for 
representatives of the Allied Supreme Command, 
to which the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese 
government are to be subordinated.”
The point raised concerned the Allied Supreme 
Commander in the Far East, and although 
Harriman had no concrete instructions in the event 
of a Soviet demarche, he knew all too well and 
fully shared the firm resolution of the White House 
and the military to maintain U.S. command in 
Japan. Therefore, his reaction was demonstrably 
inflexible. The Soviet government, the 
Ambassador abruptly replied, cannot claim to have 
veto power on this question, but as far as the 
Supreme Commander is concerned, it will 
undoubtedly be General MacArthur. Molotov 
objected that it was not a question of veto power, 
but one of agreement and that Marshal Vasilevsky 
could perform these duties equally as well as
211 Plan soobshcheniia o sovetsko-kitaiskikh
peregovorakh, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 7, d. 79, ll. 11-
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MacArthur. Kerr tried to smooth over the dispute 
by emphasizing that although the primary role in 
the Far East by rights belonged to the U.S., the 
Allies should consult with one another. Harriman 
immediately proposed that the word “agreement” 
be substituted by “consultation” in the Soviet 
response and that the reference to “several 
candidacies” be removed, “otherwise Washington 
will deem this response unacceptable. Harriman 
added with exasperation in his voice,” the Soviet 
transcript of his conversation continues, “that the 
Soviet Union cannot tender such claims after only 
two days of war with Japan. The United States, by 
containing the Japanese forces, did not give the 
Japanese the opportunity to attack the Soviet 
Union during the most difficult period for the 
Soviet Union.” The People's Commissar, 
naturally, paid back in kind: “Molotov stated that 
he considers Harriman's remarks to be absolutely 
inappropriate. He, Molotov, could in that case cite 
as an example for Harriman the European war, in 
which the Soviet Union fought one-on-one for a 
period of three years.”213
“After a very heated discussion” (as Harriman 
reported the meeting), Molotov still insisted that 
the Soviet response be conveyed to the American 
government, even though the Ambassador 
continued to repeat that it would be 
unacceptable.214
Harriman's firmness had its effect: he had 
scarcely returned to the Embassy before V. Pavlov 
telephoned to inform him that after discussing the 
matter with Stalin, Molotov was prepared to clear 
up the “misunderstanding” that had arisen, in so 
far as what they had in mind was precisely 
consultations on the appointment of the high 
commander. But what about the reference to one 
candidate instead of several, the Ambassador 
asked, still not satisfied. Molotov had to get in 
touch with Stalin yet again (one can imagine the 
epithets they bestowed upon the obstinate 
American, whom years later President Kennedy 
would dub a “crocodile” for his tenacity). As a 
result, this position was also surrendered by
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06, op. 43, d. 678, ll. 41-42. The Soviet account of this 
meeting fully confirms the version put forward earlier 
by V. P. Safronov on the basis of Harriman's notes (see 
V. P. Safronov, “SSSR-SSHA-Iaponiia v kontekste 
‘kholodnoi voiny' (1945-1980),” in Sovetskaia 
vneshniaia politika v gody “kholodnoi voiny”: novote 
prochtenie, edited by L. N. Nezhinskii (Moscow, 1995), 
p. 157.
214 A. Harriman to the Secretary of State, August 11, 
1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 630.
35
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
telephone. Harriman nevertheless insisted on 
written confirmation of the agreement reached, 
which he received on the morning following this 
stormy night.215 The final “joint” response to the 
Japanese was sent from Washington that same day 
without further coordination with Moscow—“so as 
not to lose time” (as Harriman wrote to 
Molotov216), and, we should add, so as to prevent 
further interference from the Kremlin. The Soviet 
government resigned itself to this fact and with the 
subsequent appointment, on August 12th, of 
MacArthur as Supreme Commander in Japan.
In other words, a serious change in the Soviet 
position was achieved without waiting for 
approval from Washington—there simply wasn't 
time for that and Harriman did not ask for 
instructions, instead limiting himself to 
information supplied by the State Department. The 
Kremlin, accustomed to puppet ambassadors, 
evidently was convinced that Harriman was acting 
on instructions from Washington. As he explained 
his motives many years later, his “great fear, of 
course, was that if we accepted Molotov's 
language we would be in for a long negotiation 
and they would finally insist that in exchange for 
agreeing to MacArthur they should have Hokkaido 
as a Soviet zone of occupation.” Moreover, 
Harriman did not rule out the possibility (as he 
later told Stimson's deputy, Robert Lovett) that 
Washington “was so keen to get the fighting 
stopped that it would have accepted almost 
anything the Russians came back with.”217
General Deane considered this skirmish to be 
Harriman's most important victory in Moscow.218 
It soon became known to the public at large. On 
August 15th, that is, after Japan's surrender, the 
respectable New York Herald Tribune, citing the 
London correspondent for CBS Radio, Edward R. 
Murrow, printed a description of that memorable 
nighttime fray with details and phrasing that apart 
from Molotov only Harriman and Kerr could have 
known. The main topic of the newspaper story was 
simple and sensational: the Soviets wanted the 
supreme commander to be a representative of the 
Red Army; after two hours of heated debates the 
Soviets withdrew their demands and accepted the 
appointment of an American as supreme 
commander in Japan.
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Molotov could not leave this version 
unanswered, since it was a matter not only of 
decorum in Allied relations, but also of the 
prestige of a great power that supposedly had been 
put in its place by the Americans. He personally 
composed the text of the TASS rebuttal, in which 
he accurately set forth the essence of the 
“exchange of opinions” that had taken place, 
omitting only one detail—his proposal of 
Vasilevsky's candidacy. This refutation also noted 
that “the appointment of General MacArthur took 
place after consultations with the Soviet 
Government,” which from the very beginning had 
not opposed his candidacy. All this allowed the 
author to conclude that the New York Herald 
Tribune, which reported that “Soviet official 
circles considered that the Supreme Commander 
should be a representative from the Red Army and 
that supposedly such a demand had been presented
by the Soviet government to the American
219government is pure invention.”
This entire exchange of civilities took place on 
the background of celebrations of Soviet- 
American friendship held in connection with the 
visit of the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces 
in Europe, General Eisenhower. The illustrious 
commander was greeted not only with all official 
honors, but also with genuine mass enthusiasm. 
When he made his appearance with G. K. Zhukov 
at a soccer match at Dynamo Stadium, Harriman 
would recall that “the cheers in the stadium 
surpassed anything I had ever heard.”220 On 
August 12th, during the first parade of athletes held 
on Red Square since the end of the war, Stalin 
bestowed upon Eisenhower and Harriman an 
unprecedented honor for “bourgeois guests”—he 
invited them to stand atop Lenin's Mausoleum. 
And that is how they have remained standing to 
this day on photographs from Soviet newspapers— 
Harriman on Stalin's left, Eisenhower on the right, 
next to Zhukov.
Meanwhile, the diplomatic struggle 
surrounding Japan and the Far East continued. On 
August 16th, a second attempt was made by the 
Kremlin to burrow deeper into Japanese matters, 
namely, Stalin's request that the surrender of 
Japanese troops be secured not only on the Kurile 
Islands (about which Truman had tried “to forget” 
in his orders to MacArthur), but in northern 
Hokkaido as well, about which there had been no 
discussion in Yalta. While Truman had to yield on 
the first point, he firmly rejected the Hokkaido
219 Pravda, August 18, 1945; for Molotov's draft see: 
AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 47, d. 743, ll. 53-55.
220 Special Envoy, p. 502.
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scenario, moreover requesting in a highly brusque 
manner that the U.S. Air Force be granted the right 
to have a base on one of the Kurile Islands (a long- 
held plan of the Americans who hankered after 
these islands as a staging-post between the 
Aleutian Islands and Japan). Having swallowed 
the bitter pill of Hokkaido, Stalin paid Truman 
back in kind: demands such as these, he replied, 
are made either to a defeated country or a weak 
ally, and the USSR is neither of these.221 Truman 
was forced to back down and sent an apologetic 
reply in which he explained that he had in mind 
only temporary landing rights during the Japanese 
occupation. After reading Truman's letter, 
Harriman breathed a sigh of relief, since from the 
very beginning he had considered a base in the 
Kuriles to be a hopeless proposition. While 
delivering the letter to Stalin, the Ambassador 
stated (according to the Soviet transcript of the 
conversation) that “when he received Truman's 
first letter on this issue, he, Harriman, had feared 
that it would not be properly understood by 
Comrade Stalin. This most recent letter from 
Truman would clarify the issue.”222 For now the 
matter was settled, but Harriman knew that it 
would not end there. He even decided to postpone 
tendering his resignation until the question of the 
control mechanism for Japan was resolved. 
Reporting to Byrnes that he foresaw “some trouble 
with the Soviets” on this issue, Harriman 
nevertheless believed it was entirely possible that 
the U.S. could make a stand for the same 
predominant role in Japan that the USSR had in 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.223
Harriman was not mistaken. Questions of 
consolidating the Great Powers' “spheres of 
influence” were the center of attention at the 
September meeting of the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in London. The Ambassador did 
not take an active part in the debates, but rather 
kept to his customary role of behind-the-scenes 
adviser. Although he fully approved of Byrnes's 
tough approach for negotiating with Moscow, he 
was quick to note a tactical misstep on the part of 
the inexperienced Secretary of State, namely, he 
had miscalculated that a preemptory, pedantic tone 
could be utilized in this dialogue with Moscow. He 
advised Byrnes that one should always be firm, but 
that one should not be afraid to be respectful and
221 Perepiska, vol. 1, p. 265.
222 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d.378, l. 17.
223 A. Harriman to Secretary of State, August 23, 1945, 
FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 689.
friendly.224 Harriman believed that Byrnes made 
another mistake with his demonstrative 
unwillingness even to discuss the issue of 
organizing the control mechanism for Japan, 
which merely served to inflame the Soviets' 
suspicions and dissatisfaction, especially given the 
fact that at the same time Byrnes and Bevin 
persistently disputed the legitimacy of the pro-
Soviet regimes in Romania and Bulgaria. As 
Harriman acknowledged at an Embassy conference 
to discuss the results of the London session, “We 
are to blame to this extent. We did not keep the 
Soviets in touch with our own thinking. They are 
concerned that we are going ahead unilaterally.”225
The London session, which can be 
characterized as a reciprocal demonstration of 
toughness, ended without achieving anything and 
now Harriman, as Byrnes instructed him, would 
have to “get the train back on the rails.”226 To this 
end, the Ambassador proposed that “Truman send 
him a telegram to be delivered to Stalin 
personally.” This would allow Harriman to hear 
from Stalin himself “the basic questions which 
were disturbing the Russians.” Both Byrnes and 
Harriman (as well as Truman himself) hoped that 
talking with Stalin directly would clarify the 
Soviet position and help to put the post-London 
impasse behind them. While still in London, 
Harriman and James Dunn composed a draft, 
which the White House used as the basis for 
Truman's letter to Stalin.227 *
Delivering this letter, however, proved to be 
not so simple. In early October the Generalissimus 
left for the south for his first leave of absence in 
nine years, which plunged the foreign diplomats 
and journalists in Moscow into a state of skeptical 
confusion as they sought to learn the “real 
reasons” behind the disappearance of the 
Kremlin's chief resident. Rumors began to 
circulate that Stalin was gravely ill, had retired and 
even that he was dead. Harriman was not immune 
to this frenzied speculation and he informed 
Washington of Stalin's mysterious and 
“unprecedented” disappearance from the capital. 
He more and more insistently requested a meeting 
with him to deliver a “very important message 
from President Truman.” As a mark of his genuine 
regard for Stalin, Harriman made assurances that
224 Memorandum Handed to Jimmy Dunn, WAHP, CF,
Cont. 182.
225 Ambassador's Staff Conference, October 10, 1945, 
WAHP, CF, Cont. 183.
226 Special Envoy, p. 510.
227 For the Secretary from Dunn and Harriman, October
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“as always he would go to Generalissimus Stalin 
as a friend.”228 After a lengthy bout of wrangling, 
Molotov, who did not divulge Stalin's 
whereabouts, finally agreed to relay the Allied 
Ambassador's request. The latter was quite 
surprised when he received a positive reply to his 
request three days later. New archival documents 
shed light on the motives and circumstances 
behind this unusual invitation.
Harriman's request was brought up for 
consideration by the foreign policy “Politburo 
Four” on October 16th. That same day they 
communicated their opinion to the “Master”: “We 
believe that Harriman should be received, since he 
bears a message from Truman, and given the 
President's request, as well as the fact that the 
Americans have taken the initiative in this 
question of further discussions of what transpired 
at the London session of the Council of Ministers. 
In this matter, however, it is not desirable that 
Harriman should know the location of where you 
are staying for rest purposes.”229
The comrades' thoughtfulness was not limited 
to the Leader's safety—they enclosed with the 
dispatch a draft for Stalin's reply to Harriman, 
which evidences their desire to emphasize their 
own importance in the matter: “I, of course, would 
be happy to receive you as a guest and friend here 
where I am spending my rest period. At the same 
time, I should say that it is not customary among 
us that during a leave of absence the head of 
government should undertake any decisions 
without consulting with his government 
colleagues.”230
Stalin, like his colleagues, was intrigued by 
Harriman's commission. After the break-down of 
the London talks, his strategy had been one of 
wait-and-see, expecting that the Allies would falter 
and meet the Soviet demand on the Balkans and 
Japan halfway, and return to the Yalta formula for 
deciding questions of peace treaties. Truman's 
“important message” might just be such a step to 
meet the Soviets halfway, for which it would be 
possible to break the tradition of a monarch 
steeped in solitude. Therefore Stalin, after thinking 
the matter over, sent his response to the Politburo 
Four in the early hours of October 18th: “In view of 
your wishes, I do not object to receiving Harriman 
in Sochi in order to hear his commentary to 
Truman's message. If it should become clear
228 Reception of U.S. Ambassador Harriman, October 
15, 1945, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, pp. 44, d. 681, l. 2.
229 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 97, l. 66.
230 Molotov to Stalin, October 16, 1945, AVP RF, f. 06, 
op. 7, p. 44, d. 681, l. 5.
during my conversation with Harriman that he is 
not confining himself to commentary and is trying 
to get the issue resolved, I will answer him that as 
I am on leave of absence I cannot make any 
decision without consulting a governmental 
representative. In that case I will summon Molotov 
and we will either decide in the affirmative, if it is 
in our favor, or in the negative, if it is not in our 
favor.”231
After making this concession to collegiality, 
however, Stalin removed the reference to his 
government colleagues from the Politburo Four's 
draft of the reply to Harriman as well as the 
Caucasian curtsies to his “guest and friend.” His 
own handwritten reply (with the postscript: 
“deliver to Harriman from me”) ran as follows: “I 
would be happy to receive you in Sochi, where I 
am spending my leave of absence and am ready to 
hear his [sic!—V.P.] commentary to President 
Truman's message.”232
Truman's message largely concerned the 
Balkans and convening a peace conference, but 
Harriman was convinced that Stalin was mainly 
interested in Japan. “Knowing how blunt and 
direct Stalin has always been in my conversations 
with him,” the Ambassador wrote to Byrnes, “I 
believe that he will contend that after inviting the 
Soviet Union to come into the war against Japan 
we are now excluding him from appropriate 
consideration in dealing with a defeated Japan.” 
Harriman urgently requested instructions on Japan 
before meeting with Stalin so that he could 
“present frankly our position and attempt to get his 
general agreement and so avoid if possible the 
development of an impasse.”233
But Washington did not want him to speak 
frankly with Stalin about Japan. Indeed, 
Washington was aiming for a U.S. monopoly on 
Japan, but wanted to camouflage this by creating 
the appearance of Allied cooperation. The 
problem, as Deputy Secretary of State Acheson put 
it at a conference on October 22, was “to resolve 
this controversy with the Soviet Union by giving 
that Government a face-saving solution.”234 The 
concrete form of this symbolic participation still 
remained unclear, since MacArthur objected even 
to the establishment of an advisory Military 
Council of which he would be chairman, as the 
State Department had proposed. Therefore, 
Harriman was given very vague instructions on 
this score, which emphasized that all these ideas
231 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 97, l. 71.
232 Ibid., pp. 72-74.
233 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 755-56.
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(including the participation of Soviet troops in the 
occupation of Japan under MacArthur's command) 
are of a preliminary nature and are intended to 
elucidate the Soviet reaction.235
On October 24th, Harriman accompanied by 
NKID and NKVD personnel, arrived in Adler, 
where he was met by V. Pavlov and General 
Vlasik, the head of Stalin's personal guard, to take 
him to Gagra.236 There the Ambassador was 
comfortably accommodated in Beria's former 
residence, but Harriman had already managed to 
note the contrast between the lush natural setting 
and the poverty of the living conditions of ordinary 
people.237 Stalin extended him a cordial welcome 
on the threshold of his dacha and immediately 
turned to the business at hand. “The message does 
not raise the Japanese question,” he said, after 
familiarizing himself with the text, evidently 
disappointed by the absence of the expected 
concession. Harriman with alacrity informed Stalin 
“unofficially of the direction the thinking of the 
President's advisers was taking in respect to 
Japan.” However, throughout the entire discussion 
about taking the USSR's interests into account 
sounded the refrain that “General MacArthur must 
have the final say in the matter.” Stalin heard out 
the Ambassador attentively, but he did not initiate 
a detailed discussion of the Japanese question, 
limiting himself instead to the observation that a 
Control Commission ought to be created in Japan, 
similar to those in Hungary and Romania, in which 
MacArthur would be the chairman with the final 
word. He also expressed doubt on the expediency 
of Soviet troops taking part in the occupation of 
Japan under MacArthur's command, giving as his 
reason that such participation might infringe upon 
MacArthur's authority, “which the U.S. does not 
want.” (In actual fact, Stalin simply did not want a 
symbolic, subordinate role in the occupation.)
The conversation then moved on to the part of 
Truman's letter that raised the subject of 
convening a peace conference. The United States, 
like England, had come out in favor of greatly 
increasing the delegation to include countries that 
had shown their loyalty, hoping thereby to leave 
the USSR and its allies in a clear minority; the 
Soviet position for the same reasons was exactly
235 Ibid., p. 773.
236 The well-known facts of this visit notwithstanding, 
P. Sudoplatov in his memoirs writes that Stalin denied 
Harriman this visit, which supposedly signified the end 
of his access to the very top and consequently his 
effectiveness as ambassador (P. and A. Sudoplatov,
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the opposite. Harriman, therefore, spoke of the 
“indivisibility of war,” about the difficulties in 
calculating the contributions of various countries, 
about the need to give all countries that one way or 
another had supported the Allies an opportunity to 
“state their views” on the drafts of the peace 
treaties. Stalin was operating with other, more 
tangible, categories—the number of soldiers 
“expended” by one or another country, the degree 
of involvement of different countries (“what does 
Costa Rica have to do with signing a peace treaty 
with Romania?'), with preference given to 
countries that suffered the most or which really 
had fought against one of the Axis countries. “One 
cannot put on the same level a nation that truly 
waged war, made sacrifices and suffered 
occupation with a nation that made no sacrifices. 
That would be unjust. He, Comrade Stalin, did not 
make up the disparities in how individual countries 
had conducted themselves. It just so happened that 
some nations waged war, others merely announced 
that they were in a state of war, while yet others, 
including some United Nations countries, aided 
the Germans.”238 Stalin, therefore, first proposed 
convening several conferences “of the small 
circle” of countries that were genuinely involved, 
and then later, as a compromise measure, he 
agreed to a general peace conference to which the 
countries involved would be invited in turn to 
discuss the peace treaties one after the other. 
Stalin's archive contains a copy of the list of 
countries the Americans proposed along with the 
Dictator's notes (each country is marked by a plus 
or minus). These notes clearly show that a 
compromise was in the offing, which cannot be 
said for the question of Japan, to which the two 
returned the following day in another discussion 
that lasted almost three hours.
Not given to impulsive decisions, Stalin 
apparently had carefully thought everything over 
before speaking out on Japan. He understood 
perfectly well the game the Americans were 
playing by creating the outward appearance of 
Soviet participation in Japan and he did not intend 
to play into their hand. The following evening he 
called a spade a spade, and now Harriman had to 
hear him out and make excuses. The Soviet 
government, Stalin began, “has not been assigned 
any role of responsibility in Japan,” and did not 
intend to be an “appendage” without bearing joint 
responsibility for policy in Japan and without 
having any influence on this policy.” Perhaps the
238 Transcript of the meeting between I. V. Stalin and 
U.S. Ambassador Harriman, October 24, 1945, AVP 
RF, f. 07, op, 10-v, p. 46, d. 1, l. 14.
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United States, Stalin sarcastically inquired, “needs 
a satellite in Japan rather than an ally. I must say 
that the Soviet Union is not suited for such a 
role. It would be more honest for the USSR to 
get out of Japan altogether rather than remain there 
as mere furniture.”239
Stalin's indignation was undoubtedly genuine. 
He essentially repeated for the Americans what a 
month earlier he had conveyed to Molotov in 
London, when in connection with developments 
on Japan he wrote of “the impertinence of the 
English and the Americans” and their lack of an 
“elementary sense of respect for their ally.”240 But 
Stalin saved the most serious warning for last: 
“Comrade Stalin said that he had never been a 
proponent of an isolationist policy, but that now 
perhaps the Soviet Union ought to adopt such a 
policy. Perhaps there's nothing so wrong with it.” 
Harriman surmised that it was not so much a 
question of isolationism as one of refusing to 
coordinate policy with the Allies and adopting a 
policy of go it alone.241
Stalin probably understood that given the 
current situation he would hardly succeed in 
wringing a significant role in Japan from the 
Americans, but the matter was too serious not to 
exhaust all the possibilities. Besides he had 
nothing to lose, since even if nothing were gained, 
he would be able to get more bargaining power for 
this concession, for example, U.S. agreement to 
the Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans. It 
was not by accident that in his conversation with 
Harriman, Stalin unambiguously asked “to convey 
to the President that he, Comrade Stalin, links the 
question in Japan with questions raised in the 
President's message.”242 243The Generalissimus
heavily underscored this passage of the
243transcript.
The two men parted on good terms. Stalin, 
Harriman reported not without a sense of pride, 
“could not have been more friendly to me 
personally and when we parted he said that he had 
been glad to receive me not only as the American 
Ambassador but as a friend.”244
Harriman's reports on his meetings with Stalin 
were written with great zeal and did not come 
easily for him, since he was an indifferent stylist.
239 Ibid., l. 23.
240 See “Perepiska Stalina s Molotovym,” Istochnik, 
(1999), no. 2, p. 76.
241 Special Envoy, p. 517.
242 Transcript of the meeting between I. V. Stalin and
U.S. Ambassador Harriman, AVP RF, f. 07, op. 10-v, p. 
46, d. 1, l. 18.
243 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 378, l. 48.
244 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 796.
As George Kennan recalled many years later, after 
each such meeting (usually late at night) the 
Ambassador would summon his principal aides to 
Spaso House and “dictate for hours, join battle 
with nuances of grammar and would resort to our 
help only on those questions. These vigils would 
often drag on into the early morning hours, after 
which I would have to deliver the text to 
Mokhovaya [i.e., to the Embassy—V.P.], and at 
6:00 a.m. Harriman would call again to find out 
when and how the coding went.”245 Harriman was 
rarely seen on Mokhovaya Street, entrusting the 
day-to-day operations of the Embassy to Kennan.
Rumors of the unusual meeting quickly made 
the rounds of the envious diplomatic corps—all 
the more so since upon his return to Moscow, 
Harriman publicly refuted speculation that the 
dictator was ill. With the Leader's approval, 
Molotov was once again forced to intervene—on 
October 27th TASS, citing “authoritative sources,” 
reported that Harriman on a special commission 
for President Truman had visited I.V. Stalin in 
Sochi, where he is spending his leave, and had two 
meetings with him.”246 A detailed transcript of 
both meetings was carefully edited by Stalin and 
on his orders was sent to the Politburo Four.247
On the day after his return to Moscow, 
Harriman received instructions from Washington 
with new proposals for the control mechanism in 
Japan, which made provision for the creation of an 
Allied Military Council, a purely advisory body 
under MacArthur, in tandem with the Far Eastern 
Commission. The Ambassador immediately noted 
a point that the Kremlin would find 
unacceptable—the voting procedure proposed for 
the Far Eastern Commission, by which decisions 
were to be made by a majority of votes, including 
three of the four main Allies. The Ambassador 
predicted that Stalin would object to the proposed 
procedure, take it to be directed against the Soviet 
Union and insist on a unanimous vote from the 
four main powers. The Kremlin's motives in this 
instance, he explained in his next dispatch, were 
completely understandable, since it feared that 
“Japan like Germany might some day be utilized 
by Western Powers as springboard for attack on 
USSR. Japan as much as Eastern Europe is in 
Soviet zone of vital strategic interest.”248
245 Author's interview with George Kennan, March 8,
1995.
246 Pravda, October 27, 1945 (the corrections on this 
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However, at his meetings with Molotov on 
November 1 and 3, the People's Commissar did 
not raise objections to this point. Molotov not only 
gave his preliminary approval, but during the 
course of the discussion he even proposed 
reducing the number of required votes of the 
leading countries be reduced from three to two. 
Molotov's reservations hinged on granting 
MacArthur final authority, even in those cases 
when members of the Allied Military Council 
were opposed. Harriman answered, according to 
the Soviet transcript of the meeting, that in those 
instances “the Supreme Commander has the final 
decision and that Generalissimus Stalin had 
allegedly given his consent to this issue during 
their meeting in Sochi.”
In his meeting with Harriman, Stalin had 
indeed recognized MacArthur's “final word” and 
his predominant role. While studying the transcript 
of the meeting, Molotov heavily underlined the 
pertinent passages.249 Apparently, that was why he 
did not dispute this position. But this time he was 
poorly served by following the letter of the 
Leader's instructions. Because now Stalin, after 
receiving Molotov's notes on his recent meetings 
with Harriman, underlined in exasperation both 
Molotov's consent to the voting rules and the 
passage about MacArthur's final authority.250 
Stalin received in Gagra along with these notes a 
draft of the response to the Americans on the 
Japanese question, drawn up by Molotov and 
approved by the Politburo Four, which essentially 
represented a statement of agreement to the U.S. 
proposals.
If Stalin noticed his blunder, which Harriman 
was quick to seize, he preferred to pass it on to his 
deputy, particularly since the latter had given him 
grounds to do so by his haste on the voting issue. 
On October 14th, the Master sent the Politburo 
Four an angry reply, calling their draft 
“unsatisfactory.” First, he objected to the 
Americans' designation of the body as the Allied 
Military Council, believing that it excessively 
limited its functions and “emphasized the advisory 
aspect of this body under MacArthur, which is not 
to our advantage.” It should be called the Allied 
Control Council. Then he proceeded to the 
allocation of authority between MacArthur and the 
Allied Council: “You avoid the question of the 
right of one of the members of the control body to 
appeal to its government in the event of a
249 Transcript of meeting between I. V. Stalin and U.S. 
Ambassador Harriman, AVP RF, f. 07, op. 10-v, p. 46, 
d. 1, l. 5.
250 AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 770, ll. 92-93.
disagreement with MacArthur on questions of 
principle. But to avoid a question does not mean 
that it is resolved,” he writes for the edification of 
the Politburo Four. “.Harriman is incorrect in 
asserting that I agreed to confer upon MacArthur 
rights without appeal.” Stalin proposed that in 
cases of disagreements of principle between the 
Council and the Supreme Commander to stop the 
execution of this decision until the governments 
come to an agreement. But Stalin saved his 
harshest words at the end for Molotov (who by this 
point had committed other offenses at the London 
session of the Council of Ministers). “The 
proposed majority of three votes from the Great 
Powers is an underhanded proposition that seeks to 
isolate us,” he wrote on the voting procedure in the 
Far Eastern Commission, thereby confirming 
Harriman's prognosis. “The proposal of a majority 
of two votes is not better than the proposal for 
three votes. Molotov was not authorized to speak 
out in favor of two votes. Molotov's conduct of 
setting himself apart from the government and 
portraying himself as more liberal and conciliatory 
than the government is absolutely inappropriate.” 
In conclusion Stalin ordered that the Soviet 
objections “in the form of amendments to the 
American proposals” be conveyed to Harriman, 
which was a tactically astute move.
The Politburo Four instantly responded to 
Stalin's scolding, lumping the blame on its eldest 
member. That same day Stalin received for his 
approval from Beria, Malenkov and Mikoyan a 
draft of a Politburo resolution: “It is acknowledged 
that in his negotiations with Harriman, Molotov 
committed a mistake. Comrade Molotov should 
be reprimanded because he was not authorized in 
his negotiations with Harriman to speak out in 
favor of two votes and to acknowledge as incorrect 
Molotov's behavior of setting himself apart from 
the government and to portray [sic!—V.P.] as 
more liberal and conciliatory than the 
government.” A handwritten note by the offender 
was enclosed with this text: “In future I will try not 
to commit such mistakes.”251
Molotov indeed did try. Already the following 
day he urgently invited Harriman and handed him 
the Soviet amendments based on Stalin's 
instructions. Ignorant of the clashes in the 
Kremlin, the Ambassador decided that this was 
another instance of Molotov's “customary tactics 
of increasing Soviet demands.” Nevertheless, 
Harriman recommended to Byrnes that some small 
concession be made: to agree to the Allied Control 
Council or Commission, without altering the
AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 770, l. 108.
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purely advisory functions of this body, to allow 
broad consultations in the event of differences of 
principle between the Council and MacArthur, 
reserving for the latter the final word, if a 
settlement cannot be reached.252
However, Washington found the Soviet 
proposals to be unacceptable and on November 9th 
Harriman delivered to Molotov a diplomatic note 
from his government. The note lay special stress 
on the fact that the Soviet amendments 
“paralyzed” the actions of the U.S. in Japan and 
represent a “complete departure from Stalin's 
statement to [Harriman].”253
These persistent references to the 
Generalissimus's own views compelled Stalin to 
essay yet another explanation both for his own 
people and the Americans. On November 11th, he 
composed in his own hand a note in response, 
which maintained that “the information the U.S. 
government has in regard to the position of the 
Soviet government and Generalissimus Stalin 
contains certain inaccuracies. Stalin recognized 
and continues to recognize that the U.S. has 
greater responsibilities in regard to matters in 
Japan that do the other Allies, but he never agreed 
that these responsibilities should be borne 
exclusively by the U.S., for he believes that 
responsibility should also be borne by the Allied 
Powers whose troops took an active part in the 
defeat of the Japanese armed forces.” This same 
ponderously precise tone (“Stalin recognized and 
continues to recognize”) was also used to describe 
his views on MacArthur's “deciding vote” in all 
matters except for “ones of principle, such as 
changes in the regime of control over Japan, 
changes in the leadership of the Japanese 
government, etc.” An unusual summary of the 
USSR's position followed: “In all this the Soviet 
government is in agreement with Stalin.”
The Gagra hermit dispatched the draft of the 
note to the Politburo Four for their consideration, 
adding that he “was not certain whether the draft 
was not without faults.” The Four, with the recent 
dressing-down fresh in their minds, did not share 
the Master's authorial doubts. “We approve of the 
draft, we do not have any corrections,” they 
telegraphed the next morning to Gagra.254 They, 
however, risked making one correction: they 
changed “Stalin” to “I. V. Stalin.” The note was 
delivered that same day to Harriman, who 
immediately pronounced the revisions to be 
unacceptable. The Embassy did not detect Stalin's
252 FRUS, 1945, vol.6, pp. 831-32.
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authorship of the note; Kennan was the only one to 
be put on his guard by the unusual emphasis on the 
Soviet government's solidarity with its premier, 
and he saw this as a sign that Stalin's position was 
shaky. (Harriman answered that he did not see the 
grounds to draw such conclusions.)255
If the firmness of Stalin's position occasioned 
no doubts for the Ambassador, then the motives 
and bounds of the dictator's policies continued to 
raise questions. Harriman's most dire misgivings 
on this score were aggravated by Maxim Litvinov, 
who at a chance meeting in the foyer of the 
Bolshoi Theater lamented the hopelessness of the 
situation and his powerlessness to change it. In his 
report on this conversation to Washington, 
Harriman placed it in the general context of 
growing anti-American sentiment in Moscow and 
the tendency toward unilateral actions in Soviet 
policy.256
A few days later Harriman, trying to explain 
this shift in sentiment, singled out the role of the 
atomic factor and tried to put himself in the 
Russians' shoes after Hiroshima. The bomb's 
psychological effect on the Russians, he wrote, 
proved to be particularly strong, since it came on 
the heels of the triumph of Soviet military and 
political might, which after long years of isolation 
and wars, it seemed, had at last safeguarded the 
security of the USSR for many years to come by 
creating the necessary line of defense along 
practically the entire perimeter of the country. The 
atomic bomb in one fell swoop devaluated the role 
of the Red Army as defender and the importance 
of the territories won during the war, which “must 
have revived their old feeling of insecurity.” The 
Ambassador offered this hypothesis “only as a 
partial explanation of the strange psychological 
effect of the atomic bomb on the behavior of the 
Soviet leaders... as a result it would seem that they 
have returned to their tactics of obtaining their 
objectives through aggressiveness and intrigue.”257
In light of what we now know about the 
Kremlin's thinking at the time, Harriman made a 
remarkably accurate diagnosis, though it is not 
clear why he considered this psychological effect 
to be “strange.” Soviet fears of a U.S. atomic 
monopoly were just as natural as the euphoria of 
the Americans who came out of the war not only 
as the only economic superpower, but the owner of 
the monopoly on the new superweapon. It was 
precisely this “American arrogance” to which
255 G. Kennan to A. Harriman, December 11, 1945, 
WAHP, CF, Cont. 184.
256 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 921-22.
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Maisky gently referred during one of his last 
meetings with Harriman in early December. He 
enjoined his “old friend” to understand “that we all 
live on the same small planet, and that this planet 
with each year becomes smaller and smaller, and 
nations come into contact with one another more 
and more, and therefore the United States in its 
attempts to maintain peace should recognize to a 
greater extent the principles of equality with all the 
attending circumstances this implies when dealing 
with other countries..” Harriman, according to 
the Soviet transcript of this conversation, agreed 
that the Americans had indeed exhibited “elements 
of arrogance,” but he tried to make the argument 
that the case in question was merely a matter of 
individual persons or groups in the United 
States.”258 (Stalin and Molotov underlined the 
passage about “arrogance,” which evidently 
coincided with their own sense of the situation.259)
It was during this period that the State 
Department's Division of Eastern European 
Affairs was weighing the advisability of having 
the Ambassador, given his unique access, seek a 
meeting with Stalin: “Mr. Harriman has enjoyed a 
somewhat unique position in having dealt with 
Stalin more than most other foreigners. 
[Harriman's position] offers an excellent 
opportunity for him to speak frankly with Stalin on 
these subjects.” The Eastern European Division, 
however, decided to keep this option in reserve 
“unless our position on these matters reaches the 
Russians on a higher level.”260
This opportunity came in December at the 
Moscow Council of Ministers of the three Great 
Powers. The initiative came from Byrnes, who had 
tried to untie the post-London knot in Allied 
relations and hoped to conduct negotiations with 
Stalin personally. He did not know that on the eve 
of the conference Stalin had urged his colleagues 
to adopt a policy of “endurance and 
determination” in dealing with the Ango-Saxons, 
reminding them that from partners such as these 
“we cannot get anything serious if we begin to 
give way to intimidations, if we show signs of 
wavering.”261
Harriman was skeptical of Byrnes's diplomatic 
capabilities—he did not like the fact that there had 
been no preliminary consultations with the British, 
nor that his advice to the Secretary of State on the
258 Conversation with Harriman, December 12, 1945 
(from Maisky's journal), AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, d. 51, ll. 
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259 Ibid., AP RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 234, l. 45
260 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 924, 926.
261 “Perepiska Stalina s Molotovym,” p. 85.
strategy for the negotiations had been ignored, nor 
Byrnes's refusal to inform Washington on a 
regular basis about the conference's progress. As a 
result, the Ambassador abandoned his attempts to 
influence Byrnes, having decided (as he wrote in 
his diary): “I thought I had better wait and see 
what happened.”262
Nevertheless, a quite serious bargaining 
session took place, as a result of which the USSR 
and the U.S. consolidated their pre-eminent 
interests in their spheres of influence at the price 
of mutual concessions: the U.S. and England 
agreed to recognize the pro-Soviet governments in 
Romania and Bulgaria, provided that a minimum 
number of representatives of the “loyal 
opposition” be included in the governments, while 
the USSR resigned itself to an altogether modest 
role in the Far East Commission and Allied 
Council in Japan, which still represented progress 
in comparison to the Americans' frontal attack on 
this issue in the past.263 Compromise solutions 
were also reached on the participants for the 
forthcoming peace conference, as well as the 
establishment of the U.N. Commission on Atomic 
Energy.
However, a frank conversation about the real 
intentions on big issues did not take place. Both 
sides continued to act “in the dark,” trying to 
maintain a free hand, while presenting the other 
side with accomplished facts, which promised 
nothing but a further erosion of trust. “The United 
States has been planning and taking certain 
measures for its own security,” Harriman stated in 
a memorandum written while the council was in 
progress. “These have not been disclosed to the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Government for its 
part has not informed the United States of its 
security plans except in general terms..”264
Nevertheless, the conference ended to the 
mutual satisfaction of both sides (if one leaves out 
the British). One last mission lay ahead for 
Harriman as a result of the Moscow conference, 
namely, traveling to Romania as a member of the 
Allied commission (with Kerr and Vyshinsky) as
262 Notes Regarding Conference of Foreign Ministers at 
Moscow, December 18, 1945, WAHP, CF, Cont. 185.
263 The resolution on the voting procedure in the Far 
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gave the Soviet representatives in the Council an 
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consultants on the reorganization of the 
government. The Anglo-Saxons' misgivings 
regarding the futility of their mission in Bucharest 
proved to be completely warranted: the political 
situation was controlled by the Groza government, 
which in turn was under Moscow's control. The 
inclusion of two opposition ministers without 
portfolio (moreover, selected by the government) 
would not change anything. Harriman and Kerr 
could only listen to the entreaties of the leaders 
and protests of the anti-Soviet opposition, Maniu 
and Bratianu, appeal to Vyshinsky to adopt a 
“good neighbor” policy, and try to secure 
guarantees and dates for conducting “free” 
elections. They did not succeed in obtaining the 
latter—Groza on various pretexts evaded concrete 
obligations, putting them off with vague promises 
and vulgar jokes such as “What kind of elections 
can there be on an empty stomach?”265 But 
Vyshinsky nipped in the bud even these feeble 
attempts as he viewed such maneuvers as a 
departure from the resolutions of the Moscow 
conference. (He describes with relish in his report 
to Molotov how he had rebuffed Harriman's 
“underhanded politics.”)266 So as not to prolong 
the agony, after the requisite wrangling Harriman 
and Kerr acquiesced to the proposed candidacies 
and recommended to their governments that the 
Groza government be recognized. The infamous 
end to the Romanian drama merely served to 
hasten Harriman's departure from Moscow. On 
January 20th the Ambassador presided over a 
farewell meeting at Mokhovaya. His final 
instructions to his staff were very pessimistic: 
“there is no settlement with Russia,” but the 
Russians “are not strong enough” now to opt for a 
complete break with the Allies. The staff meeting 
ended with “a general discussion as to what our 
policy should be in the future in order to promote 
our interests against the Russian policy.”267
Late evening that same day Harriman paid his 
farewell visit to Molotov, to whom he disclosed 
“in secret” his impending resignation and the fact 
that he had no firm plans for the future. The 
People's Commissar expressed his regret and the 
hope that Harriman, with his “great experience,” 
would not abandon politics.” The Ambassador
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WAHP, CF, Cont. 18.
266 “Tri vizita A. Ia. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest (1944-
1946),” Dokumenty rossiiskikh arkhivov (Moscow, 
1998), p. 191.
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replied that he was not planning “to divorce 
himself completely from Soviet-American affairs, 
which had become so dear to his heart,” and 
promised “to use this experience for the good of 
Soviet-American relations.” “.the useful role that 
Harriman has played,” the People's Commissar 
said in conclusion, “is not subject to doubt by 
friends of the Soviet Union and the U.S.” At the 
end of the meeting Harriman requested a meeting 
with Stalin, but received the usual evasive reply 
about the Leader “being busy.”268
On January 22nd, the Ambassador bid farewell 
to Maxim Litvinov, with whom, as was usually the 
case, he was more frank. And Maxim Maximovich 
with his usual insight quickly guessed the 
American's plans: “After informing me all of a 
sudden that Hopkins, according to his information, 
was seriously ill and probably dying, that there 
was almost nobody around Truman to continue the 
Roosevelt tradition and that Byrnes didn't have the 
experience, he gave me to understand that he 
would not be averse to taking the position of 
adviser to the President, which Hopkins held under 
Roosevelt. He added that in that case he was 
expecting to come to Moscow again.” Toward the 
end of their conversation, Harriman, evidently 
hoping to elicit equal frankness from Litvinov, 
lamented the USSR's policies in the Balkans and 
asked “whether we intended to swallow up all of 
Europe.” But Litvinov chose to play it safe. “I said 
that the Ambassador was probably joking and that 
he know all too well that we did not have any such 
aspirations.” As he was looking over the transcript 
of the conversation, Molotov thickly underlined 
the passage about the intent “to swallow up all of 
Europe” and put a question mark in the margins: 
What did these unusually harsh words mean, 
coming from Harriman who was so careful in 
choosing his words?269
We do not know what precisely Molotov 
reported of the American ambassador's farewell 
conversation, but the Leader, despite his busy 
schedule, received Harriman for a farewell visit. 
The Generalissimus began with an apology: 
“Comrade Stalin says that he did not know that 
Harriman was leaving his post in Moscow, 
otherwise he, Comrade Stalin, would have set 
aside his affairs to receive Harriman earlier.” The 
Ambassador outlined his plans for the future, but 
emphasized particularly that he would likely hold
268 Reception of U.S. Ambassador Harriman, January 
20, 1946, AVP RF, f. 07, op. 31, p. 031, l. 190.
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a position in the government: “Now when Hopkins 
is so ill that he can no longer carry on political 
work, he, Harriman, remains one of the last links 
between the President and Roosevelt's old 
advisers.” A bit later in the transcript prepared by 
V. Pavlov we are told that “Comrade Stalin 
jokingly asked how it happened that Hopkins got 
married and fell ill. Harriman answered that 
Hopkins was ill before his marriage, and that now 
the illness has become acute.”
The conversation later turned to concrete 
problems in relations between the two countries. 
Stalin expressed his satisfaction with the decisions 
of the Moscow Conference, and emphasized that 
“apparently everything will be all right with Japan. 
The Soviet and American governments have found 
a common language on the Japanese matters.” “In 
Romania,” he continued, “it seems that both sides 
have displayed a sense of solidarity and the 
question has been virtually settled. As far as 
Bulgaria is concerned, the foolish opposition has 
doomed itself to failure.” Harriman hastened to 
inform him that he had already recommended that 
his government not delay in establishing relations 
with Romania, and asked Stalin about the situation 
in China. In reply Stalin told him about his recent 
meeting with Chiang Kai-shek's son, “an 
intelligent person,” in his words, who requested 
that Moscow mediate in the relations with the 
Communists. Continuing the line he had adopted 
for the Americans of distancing himself from the 
Chinese Communists, Stalin stated that the Soviet 
government was not certain whether the 
Communists would take his advice. “Comrade 
Stalin believes that the main thing is that the 
Chinese Communists disagree with the position of 
the Soviet Union on China. Therefore, the Soviet 
government, not wishing to find itself in an 
awkward position, does not want to assume the 
role of mediator.” At the same time, Stalin 
continued in reply to Harriman's questions, there 
are essentially no “profound differences” between 
Kuomintang and the Communists, since the latter 
“do not advocate the Sovietization of China,” but 
merely seek its democratization. The conversation 
touched on Korea as well, where friction had 
broken out between the USSR and U.S. 
representatives on the bilateral commission of the 
trusteeship. Stalin declared that the U.S. needed 
the trusteeship more than did the USSR (“after all, 
the proposals on Korea came from the 
Americans”), but now the U.S., it seemed, was 
beginning to find it a burden, and were making it 
out to be the Soviets' idea. Harriman promised to 
study the situation on site.
In response to the Ambassador's questions 
about Stalin's views on the situation in Japan, the 
latter replied that he believed the retention of 
imperial power to be a mistake (“it will attract 
militarists”) and lamented the insufficient 
measures taken to demilitarize the country as well 
as the lack of information from MacArthur on 
these issues. Harriman assured him that the Soviet 
representatives would be fully informed of 
developments and that they would be consulted 
more often.
The conversation lagged and the Ambassador 
asked whether he was not detaining his host. Stalin 
magnanimously replied that “he and Harriman 
were seeing each other for the last time and that 
he, Comrade Stalin, was at Harriman's service.” 
The American then posed a question about the 
fundamental differences between the USSR and 
the United States. According to the Ambassador, 
certain people in the U.S. believe the differences in 
conception to be irreconcilable. “There are 
differences in conception, but they concern the two 
countries' domestic policies,” Stalin answered 
confidently. “As to our foreign policy conceptions, 
the Soviet Union and the United States can find a 
common path. the war has shown that the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. can find a common language,” 
and that is the main thing in their relations. All that 
remained for Harriman was “to express his 
satisfaction on this point” and thank the Master of 
the Kremlin for all the consideration shown to him 
while in Moscow.
Stalin, however, had a question of his own: 
How realistic would it be for the Soviet Union to 
receive a credit or loan from the Americans, if the 
Soviet government were to raise the question 
again? Harriman answered in the affirmative, but 
with reservations about the timing and the 
expediency of examining the issue in the broad 
context of “a general basis for economic 
cooperation,” including settling the Lend-Lease 
accounts and other problems. Stalin replied, “The 
Soviet government will enter into negotiations 
with the U.S. government, but not with the 
conditions advanced by the congressmen, when 
they returned from their trip to the Soviet Union.” 
(He was referring to a delegation from the U.S. 
House of Representatives, which had met with 
Stalin in September, and then later published a 
report that outlined a number of political 
conditions for granting a loan to the Soviet Union.) 
Stalin called these conditions “offensive,” and 
declared that the “Soviet government would 
simply not entertain the discussion of such 
conditions. If that were excluded, then the Soviet 
government is ready to enter into negotiations with
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the U.S. government, if it is ready.” Judging by 
everything, Stalin still hoped to receive the 
American loan, but not at the price of political 
concessions.
In conclusion, the Generalissimus asked 
Harriman “to send his regards to Hopkins and his 
wishes for a speedy recovery. Comrade Stalin also 
asked to send his regards to the President.” The 
American transcript of this meeting blurs Stalin's 
characteristic singling out of Hopkins: “Regards 
and best wishes to Harry Hopkins and President 
Truman.” Harriman saved a personal request for 
the last: “Could he take with him back to his 
country the two horses Stalin had given him? 
Comrade Stalin answered that of course Harriman 
could. The horses are his property.”270
Stalin apparently was pleased with his last 
meeting with Harriman—on his orders a detailed 
transcript was sent to members of the Politburo 
and Soviet ambassadors in the major Western 
capitals.271 And Harriman left Moscow strongly 
affected by the mysterious magnetism of Stalin's 
personality. After dozens of meetings with him 
over the course of four years he was still unable to 
find an explanation for this. As Harriman would 
later recall, “It is hard for me to reconcile the 
courtesy and consideration that he showed me 
personally with the ghastly cruelty of his 
wholesale liquidations. Others, who did not know 
him personally, see only the tyrant in Stalin. I saw 
the other side as well—his high intelligence, that 
fantastic grasp of detail, his shrewdness and the 
surprising human sensitivity that he was capable of 
showing, at least in the war years. I found him 
better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than 
Churchill, in some ways the most effective of the 
war leaders. I must confess that for me Stalin 
remains the most inscrutable and contradictory 
character I have known—and leave the final 
judgment to history.”272
And Stalin's special regard for Harriman also 
remains not entirely clear. The most intriguing 
question—how does one explain his almost warm, 
respectful regard for this “quiet American” in light 
of the fact that the Kremlin must certainly have 
known of the Ambassador's concealed role and his 
real views as the war was ending and immediately 
afterwards? After all, there was a steady stream of 
“compromising information” on Harriman from 
the most varied sources: from Central Committee
270 Transcript of conversation between I. V. Stalin and
U.S. Ambassador Harriman, January 25, 1946, AP RF, 
f. 45, op. 1, d. 378, ll. 88-97.
271 Ibid., ll. 99-104.
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informers among the American journalists in the 
Embassy, pro-Soviet members of American 
delegations that came to Moscow in 1945,273 not to 
mention the constant surveillance and wiretapping 
on the part of the NKVD (Davies had rightly 
warned him about the omnipresent Soviet 
intelligence). Moreover, the Ambassador's 
growing toughness in the negotiations that took 
place during the summer and fall of 1945 could 
not have gone unnoticed. It was none other than 
Stalin who later spoke of Harriman as a person 
who “bears his share of responsibility for the 
deterioration in our relations after Roosevelt's 
death.”274 And despite all of this—invariable 
courtesy, special signs of consideration, generous 
gifts. (Those same horses were not simply made a 
present of to Harriman, but were transported 
directly to Baltimore, at the expense of the Soviet 
government, along with a veterinarian and three 
experienced horsemen.)275 276Nikita Khrushchev, too, 
spoke of the dictator's “great respect” for 
Harriman at a meeting with him in 1959. At that 
same meeting Khrushchev let Harriman in on a 
“secret” that also spoke of Stalin's respect for the 
Ambassador: “I will tell you a secret. When the 
war ended, the question of Petsamo arose. We 
seized it, but Stalin said we must pay something
for the nickel because, he said, Harriman is a part
276owner.”
Of course, completely rational reasons can be 
found to explain this unusual regard: Harriman 
was the envoy of the main ally, a person who was 
close to Roosevelt and later to Truman, a reliable 
connection with the White House (as the 
interception of his communications had 
confirmed), a man with a big future in politics in 
his own country. But one cannot discount Stalin's 
personal liking for Harriman, his involuntary 
respect for a prominent and independent man, so 
unlike the members of his servile entourage. 
“When speaking with Harriman,” Anatoly 
Dobrynin, who had known him well, would recall, 
“one could be certain that he would not only 
meticulously convey everything to the President
273 On Harriman's anti-Soviet orientation, see Geminder
to Paniushkin, September 18, 1945, RGASPII, f. 17, op. 
128, d. 755, ll. 24-25; on Ambassador Harriman's
opinions (a report of the Department of the Central 
Committee on the visit to the USSR of the delegation of 
KPP, October 23, 1945), ibid., d. 736, ll. 194, 211.
274 O. Troianovskii, Cherez gody i rasstoianiia 
(Moscow, 1997), p. 161.
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1946, NA RG 59, 123, Harriman W. Averell, 1946-
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276 FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 10, part 1, pp. 274, 277.
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directly, but that he would also express his point of 
view, which might influence the government's 
decisions. Stalin understood this very well and that 
was why he ‘fussed' over Harriman.”277 And yet, it 
seems, there was something else at work here, 
perhaps the peculiarly Bolshevik reverence for 
“magnates of big capital,” whom the Kremlin 
regarded as the true “masters of America,” rather 
than the usual diplomats and other “hirelings” of 
this capital. “We would like to deal with you 
because you have authority. You are a master, not 
a lackey.”278 This straightforward acknowledgment 
of Harriman's special standing, also made to 
Harriman in 1959 by Khrushchev, could not better 
convey the irresistible fascination that the name 
“Gospodin (Mr.) Harriman” evoked for circles of 
the Soviet leadership of the war generation, which 
continued to open the familiar doors of the 
Kremlin to him on his later missions to the USSR 
right up to the early 1980s.
And yet in 1946, this special regard had its 
limits. Soon after Harriman's departure from 
Moscow the NKID's Department for the Americas 
sent Vyshinsky a proposal to revive the earlier 
recommendation to award Harriman a Soviet 
decoration, which had been set aside in 1944, since 
the previous objections from the Americans about 
a “conflict of interests” were no longer an issue. It 
was proposed that the former ambassador (as 
Davies before him) be awarded the Order of 
Lenin—the highest Soviet decoration—with the 
following citation (taken from the draft of the 
Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet): “For his many achievements that 
facilitated the joining together of military efforts 
of the peoples of the U.S. and the Soviet Union... 
and his good offices in the successful resolution of 
numerous postwar problems, as well as his large 
contribution to the strengthening of friendly 
Soviet-American relations..” The department's 
staff evidently did not know which way the wind 
was now blowing at the “very top.” “I think that 
we should wait with this a while. I request your 
instructions,” Vyshinsky wrote on the 
memorandum, before sending it to Molotov. “This 
needs to be discussed,” was the Commissar's 
reaction.279 The Kremlin “waited” for almost forty 
years. Harriman did not receive his first Soviet 
medal, the Order of the Great Patriotic War, First 
Degree, until 1985; it bore almost the same
citation: “For his great personal contribution in the 
establishment and strengthening of Soviet- 
American cooperation during the years of the 
Great Patriotic War.” The White House recognized 
Harriman's services in Moscow in February 1946 
with its highest honor for civilians, the Medal for 
Merit. The asymmetry of this recognition had its 
own logic, since Harriman above all had defended 
the interests of the United States, which by no 
means always coincided with the interests of the 
USSR. For this reason, it is difficult to agree 
completely with V. T. Iungbliud's conclusion that 
“one constant” underlies all of Harriman's actions, 
namely, that they were “directed at cooperation 
with the USSR.”280 Cooperation for Harriman (as 
was the case for the Soviets as well) was far from 
an end in itself, but rather a means for attaining the 
foreign policy goals of his country.
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